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Abstract

The Department of Defense (DoD) has budgeted over $134.5 billion for Fiscal
Year 2004 for Acquisition, yet little is written about the personnel responsible for
managing and evaluating Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP), that is those
who perform Acquisition Oversight. The Acquisition Oversight process has not been
studied in a disciplined manner.
Congress, past Administrations, and the DoD Inspector General have
commissioned several studies on the Acquisition Oversight Process. Recommendations
were considered and implemented such that the process evolved to where it stands today.
Over 40 years separate the first iteration with the latest version. Commission reports,
countless studies, and historians agree on the need for oversight in military acquisitions;
they agree that the system takes too much money, takes too long, and does not perform as
well as most would wish; yet they disagree on who should perform oversight.
This thesis reviewed relevant literature to model historical oversight hierarchies.
Then expert opinions were gathered from the studies mentioned above, on how well the
oversight process modeled preformed. As expected, the oversight process has improved
over time but further improvements are currently being sought. Those seeking
improvement would do well to study past processes and learn from their mistakes.
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ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF MAJOR DEFENSE
ACQUISITION PROGRAMS – A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

I. Introduction

Background

On 11 September 2001 America awoke to the threat of terror when Al Queda
forces crashed commercial airplanes into the World Trade Center in New York and the
Pentagon in Washington D.C. President George W. Bush sent troops into Afghanistan
and later into Iraq to pursue those responsible. America’s Armed Forces accomplished
this with the use of highly skilled personnel and technologically advanced equipment.
The technology employed by America’s Armed Forces and the training on said systems
are products of the Defense Acquisition System. Keeping the technological edge over
America’s enemies requires a Defense Acquisition System that is flexible, affordable,
and manageable.
Evaluating the adequacy of the Defense Acquisition System starts by
understanding the parts of this institution and defining terms. Defense includes the
uniformed and civilian military and the officials appointed over them. The Acquisition
System is the management process by which research, development, and procurement of
an item occurs. The regulation, Department of Defense (DoD) 5000 The Defense
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Acquisition System, governs this system. As defined by the May 2003 issue of the DoD
5000 series “Defense Acquisition System is the management process by which the
Department of Defense provides effective, affordable, and timely systems to the users”
(DoD 2003). The users are the Combatant and Unified Commands.
The systems that qualify for major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) status
are multibillion dollar items such as tanks, planes, carriers and missiles. An MDAP as
described by the DoD 5000 series is “a directed, funded effort that provides a new,
improved, or continuing material, weapon, or information system or service capability in
response to an approved need” (DoD 2003). The United States Code 10 chapter 144
defines a MDAP as:
a Department of Defense Acquisition Program that is not a highly sensitive
classified program (as determined by the Secretary of Defense) and – 1) that is
designated by the secretary of defense as a major defense acquisition program; or
2) that is estimated by the Secretary of Defense to require an eventual total
expenditure for research, development, test, and evaluation of more than
$300,000,000 (based on fiscal year 1990 constant dollars) or an eventual total
expenditure for procurement of more than $1,800,000,000 (based on fiscal year
1990 constant dollars. (10 USC 2430)
The Secretary of Defense is required by law to ensure all MDAPs are being
reviewed properly. Therefore several layers of Acquisition Executives are employed to
review a program at key decision points known as milestones or “the point at which a
recommendation is made and approval sought regarding starting or continuing an
acquisition program” (DoD 2003). The management review by acquisition executives
placed within the Department of Defense prior to a milestone decision will henceforth be
called oversight.
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Programs are separated into Acquisition Categories (ACAT). MDAPs are
designated as ACAT I, a category defined by the DoD 5000 series as:
An Acquisition Category (ACAT) I program that is estimated to require an
eventual total expenditure for research, development, test and evaluation of more
than $365 million in fiscal year (FY) 2000 constant dollars or, for procurement, of
more than $2.190 billion in FY 2000 constant dollars, or a program that is
designated as an MDAP because of special interest by the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). (DoD 2003)
The MDAPs that receive the oversight from officials placed in the highest ranks of the
Defense Department are those that fall into ACAT ID. Conversely, those falling into
ACAT IC are MDAPs delegated down to the Services for milestone reviews (DoD 2003).
User Needs &
Technology Opportunities

z

Process entry at Milestones A, B, or C

z

Entrance criteria met before entering phase

z

Evolutionary Acquisition or Single Step to Full
Capability

(Program

Concept
Refinement

C

B Initiation)

A
Technology
Development
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& Demonstration
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Decision

Design
Readiness
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Pre-Systems Acquisition

Systems Acquisition

LRIP/IOT&E

FOC
Operations &
Support

FRP
Decision
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Sustainment

Figure 1. The Defense Acquisition Management Framework. (DoD 2003)

Milestone reviews occur during the system’s acquisition life; depicted in figure
one as triangles. A MDAP is initiated at milestone B (see Figure 1). Prior to milestone B
several iterative studies are performed on the product so the program baseline can be
established. With this acquisition program baseline and 19 other supportive documents
required by statute or regulations, a series of officials evaluate the product’s readiness to
become an MDAP. For more on the documentation required for a milestone review, see
DoD 5000, Table E3 (DoD 2003: 18-22).
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Quantitative Studies.
Ideally the comparison of oversight processes would be done quantitatively. That
is evaluating Acquisition Oversight process by its burden on the federal budget and
personnel, and its cost in time. Unfortunately such information is not readily available.
The Selective Acquisition Reports mandated by Congress for all MDAPs does not
contain the costs of performing the oversight over each MDAP. The Federal budget does
not record the fiscal costs of oversight activities. Personnel Commands do not have a
specialty code to record the personnel costs of oversight activities. The time to perform
one milestone review is not uniformly recorded by meeting minutes, travel logs, or any
readily available report.
The fiscal cost of acquisition oversight process has been studied by several
organizations.
The Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government, using an
indirect measure of cost of the DoD regulatory system, calculated that the
overhead, or management and control costs, associated with the DoD acquisition
process were about forty percent of the DoD acquisition budget…This figure
includes both the Government’s internal costs, and the costs borne by DoD
contractors and ultimately reimbursed by the Government (Perry 1994:5).
RAND took into consideration the Carnegie study as well as many others then made a
more conservative estimate. RAND estimates that the cost of the oversight process is
between five and ten percent of the Defense Acquisition Budget (Lorell 1990:12).
To get an idea of the magnitude of this cost see figure 2. To fund the armed
forces ability to defend America, to go to war, and to perform military duties, President
Bush requested from Congress $379.9 billion for fiscal year 2004 (DoD Budget 2003:1).
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As part of his request, $134.5 billion of the $379.9 billion or 35 percent is slated to fund
Defense Acquisition Programs (DoD Budget 2003:5). As stated previously Acquisition
Oversight costs is not a line item in the federal budget but if one puts a wedge in for this
expense it would be between $6.7 and $53.6 billion in FY 2004 dollars (using RAND 5%
estimates as low and Carnegie 40% estimates for the high). Note that these costs include
the contractors mark-up for working with the government and complying with the
government’s demand for reports. Not included in these figures are government costs
related to personnel, the maintenance of facilities, or a number of overhead costs such as
supplies; these items are included in the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) budget line.
Therefore a more precise estimate of the cost of oversight would include a margin for
these items included in the O&M budget line.
Acquisition
Oversight
$6.7B
2%

Def ense
Acquisition
$127.8B
34%

Department of
Def ense
$245.4B
64%

Figure 2 Budget Pie Chart (DoD Budget 2003)
Unlike the RAND study or the Carnegie study, The Process Action Team, as
commissioned by President Clinton in 1994, estimated the average cost for one formal
review of one MDAP. The PAT found that it costs $10-$12 million in Fiscal Year 1993
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dollars. The PAT estimated that over the MDAP’s lifetime, $40 million or more could be
spent on acquisition oversight alone (PAT 1994:8). It is not certain whether the PAT
included a margin for the O&M expenses mentioned earlier.
The time to perform oversight has only just been studied by the 1994 PAT. The
PAT commissioned the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) to study the actual average
time to perform a milestone review for one MDAP. The DoD 5000 series estimates the
average time to perform one review is 180 days. The IDA studied 150 programs across
Services, system type, and program phase. The IDA places the average time for
oversight at milestone B (Figure 1) as 10 weeks beyond the 180 days or close to 9 months
total (Bicksler 1991:50).
Personnel costs have not been studied judiciously. When challenged to estimate
the number of personnel involved with the oversight process, the PAT stated we “could
not even grossly estimate the number” (PAT 1994:8). Not all the costs are captured by
the 1994 PAT study, neither has there been studies to back up the PAT findings, nor are
there government reports currently collecting cost information. An improved data
collection method would be needed to better track the quantitative costs of oversight.
Qualitative Studies.
In addressing the question on who should perform oversight, Congress, past
Administrations, and the DoD Inspector General have commissioned several studies on
the Acquisition Process (See table 1). Recommendations were considered and
implemented such that the process evolved to where it stands today. Over 40 years
separate the first iteration of the DoD Acquisition Process with the latest version.
Reports done by major commission on Defense Acquisition Process, countless studies,
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and historians agree on the need for oversight in military acquisitions; they agree that the
system takes too much money, takes too long, and does not perform as well as most
would wish; they disagree on who should perform oversight (Defense Policy 1988,
McNaugher 1989, and GAO 1997). The commission reports listed in Table 1 has all
commented on the quality of DoD management, often in regards to Acquisition. The
reports embody the expert opinions on past oversight hierarchies and the oversight ability
to perform.
Table 1. Major Commissions on Defense Acquisition Process
Date Major Commission
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1949 First Hoover Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch
1953 Rockefeller Committee
1955 Second Hoover Commission on the Organization of the Executive
Branch
1970 Fitzhugh Commission / Blue Ribbon Defense Panel
1972 Commission on Government Procurement
1983 Grace Commission / President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Controls
1986 Packard Commission/ President’s Blue Ribbon Defense Commission
1994 Process Action Team on Oversight and Review

Problem Statement

The current Acquisition Oversight process has not been studied in a discipline
manner to understand how it is performing given the evolution of the past 40 years.
Studies centered on the Acquisition Process have primarily focused on government-tocontractor relations or on Congress’ relationship with the DoD (Farrell 1997, Fox 1994,
GAO 1997, and Harman 2003). The oversight process within the DoD has been treated
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as a “black box” where MDAPs disappear into or emerge as a new product in the hands
of the Warfighters. The first step to understanding the process is to identify the players,
their mission, and their capabilities and how they relate to each other. This thesis
identifies the organizations that perform formal milestone reviews on MDAP and how
they have evolved to their current state then evaluated performance over the years. Since
hard data on costs is not available a qualitative analysis was done in lieu of a quantitative
comparison.

Research Objectives

This thesis has three research objectives.
1) Define, document, and utilize available literature relevant to Acquisition
Oversight procedures, to identify the organizations involved with the process
as it evolved to its form today.
2) Build models of the Acquisition Oversight Process, emphasis on the chain of
command construct, as it existed in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and the
present construct.
3) Evaluate each on its ability to accomplish seven goals derived from Clinton’s
1994 Process Action Team on Acquisition Oversight report, using past
research relevant to Acquisition Oversight procedures.
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Methodology

First the organizations were identified. Then models were developed from
organization charts, historically documented relationships, and statutory relationships
recorded in Title 10. The Models have the following key (see Figure 1).
Formal Relationship

Oversight Units

Informal Relationship

Independent Units

Advisor Relationship

Figure 3. Model Key
Expert opinions regarding the oversight process in relation to seven criteria was extracted
from commission reports. If there were no comments found in the commission reports
stating differently the oversight process met each criterion.

Scope

This thesis is limited to the DoD Acquisition Oversight Process as it historically
existed between the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense, or those serving similar
positions. As such, the following limits were placed on the thesis.
1) Both the requirements generation system and the budget process are being
transformed; each is not as well documented as the Acquisition process or as
thoroughly studied. Relationships between the budget process, requirements
generation process and the Acquisition process are being redefined.
Therefore organizations generating the requirements entering the acquisition
process and organizations providing the budget and performing the planning,
programming, budgeting activities are not covered.
2) The decision to start an acquisition program requires the most intense form of
acquisition oversight. Therefore this thesis concentrates on the oversight
process at this decision point (currently Milestone B).
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3) The Air Force is the service of interest; therefore the period being covered
starts with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 and the creation
of the Air Force, and concludes in 2003 with the approval of the latest version
of the DoD 5000 series.

Assumptions

The Defense Acquisition System works with a multitude of organizations outside
the system; such interfaces can skew the effectiveness of the oversight performed.
Therefore the following assumptions have been employed for this research effort.
1) The Defense Acquisition System processes MDAP that face a stable budget
and stable requirements; it is understood that such MDAPs are rare.
2) Studies performed on acquisition and its oversight process evaluate the
process as depicted in the DoD 5000 series, Air Force regulations, and
statutory laws.
3) The majority of MDAPs went through the entire process as depicted in the
DoD 5000 series, Air Force regulations, and statutory laws.
4) External agencies to the process do not adversely affect measures of
performance.

Thesis Overview

Chapter Two focuses on entities responsible for the Acquisition Process as found
in historical literature. Discussion focuses on the evolution of the Acquisition Oversight
Process. The models of the Acquisition Oversight Process and corresponding
Commission Reports used in this research are introduced. Chapter Three focuses on the
seven criteria for an ideal Acquisition Oversight Process. An analysis of the Commission
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Studies as they relate to the seven criteria follows. The examination will focus on data
collected from reviewed documents. The results of this analysis provide the basis for
conclusions and the recommendations for change and future research, found in Chapter
Four.
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II. Literature Review

Introduction

Concerns about government officials abusing their positions for personal gain
have existed from the beginning of the republic. In early Colonial history, accusations of
favoritism and profiteering in the acquisition process were numerous and oftentimes true.
Monetary abuses were so prevalent that in 1808 Congress “devised a provision entitled
‘Officials Not to Benefit,’ which established penalties to prevent these abuses of power”
(Harma, 1995:13). With the growing cost of weapons acquisition, questions are currently
asked as to who oversees weapons acquisition and prevents abuses of taxpayer’s money
(GAO 1997).
Before World War II, budgets for the armed forces were relatively large during
war and significantly smaller during peace. In like manner, personnel employed by the
War and Navy Departments surged during war and dwindled during peace.
Administrators hired to turn domestic products into military weapons would build a
bureaucracy of reviewers and auditors then dismantle it after the threat had past. World
War II saw the advent of aviation, the birth of the atomic bomb, the genesis of rocket
power and other technological advances; such weapon systems could not be turned back
into domestic products easily. The tooling used to make these weapons were specialized
and complex. The time needed to produce these weapons was greater and the costs
higher. During the cold war, both Americans and Soviets pursued greater military
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strength, thereby participating in a great arms race. In recent years, the higher quality,
quantity, and technology inherent in America’s military are being sustained in order to
defend her against enemies and avert war. Inventing, developing, testing, evaluating,
buying, and producing implements of war grew into an immensely complex activity. The
organizational structure that performed these tasks, collectively called the Acquisition
Process, became an enduring element of the executive branch.
This thesis documents the evolution of the oversight construct placed over the
Acquisition Process with a concentration on Air Force Acquisition Oversight. Oversight
shall be defined as the performance of formal reviews of a Major Defense Acquisition
Program (MDAP) that approves entry into an Acquisition cycle, which is the creation of
an Acquisition Program for the purpose of development and eventual procurement. This
chapter evaluates relevant literature to ascertain who had performed Acquisition
Oversight from 1947 to 2003.

Role Definition (1947-1950)

During World War II the rapid expansion of the Army Air Forces “led to a split
between functions of research and development (R&D) and those of material and
support; this was accompanied by some dispersal of procurement authority” (Benson
1996:1). Beyond the Army Air Corps, the Roosevelt administration attempted to
consolidate the War Department and Navy Department acquisition decisions under one
body, that of the War Resources Board. Due to the charged political atmosphere, the
board was not used as intended and went into obscurity the same year it was created.
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Other overarching acquisition boards came and went; first the Office of Emergency
Management was created; then the Advisory Commission to the Council of National
Defense was established. The urgency of the war caused Roosevelt to create the Office
of Production Management (OPM). The “OPM assumed responsibilities for production,
materials, and employment” but because it lacked authority, it criticized military agencies
instead of manage acquisitions (Jones 1999:253). In addition, the OPM lacked military
representatives, technological expertise, or a basis to approve or cancel programs.
OPM was disbanded and Roosevelt created the War Production Board to assure
“the most effective prosecution of war procurement and production” (Jones 1999:254).
He vested it with presidential powers over all aspects of acquisition from raw materials
through production; powers the previous boards lacked. He filled it with “representatives
from the White House, the War, Navy, and Commerce Departments, the Price
Administrator, and the Board of Economic Warfare” (Jones 1999:254). In addition
Roosevelt established the Office of War Mobilization in 1943 to “develop unified
programs and to establish policies for the maximum use of the nation’s natural and
industrial resources for military and civilian needs” (Jones 1999:254). Therefore, over
the existing Service Acquisition Process, there were two overarching executive boards.
Neither the overarching executive boards, nor the services, had the acquisition expertise,
formalized procedures, or organizational structure to handle the demands for war. The
fact that the mobilization efforts succeeded to produce quality weapons systems is
accredited more to the patriotism of industry rather then the Military Acquisition Process
(Jones 1999:257).
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Emerging from World War II, the War Production Board was abolished in
November, 1945 (Columbia 2003). The Office of War Mobilization was also disbanded
two years latter. The Army Air Force once again “centralized development,
procurement, and logistics into an Air Material Command” (Benson 1996:1). Domestic
policies regained precedence in Congress while the War and Navy Departments went
their separate ways. The Department of War and the Department of the Navy were
separately administrated, had their own Presidential cabinet seat, fell under separate
Congressional subcommittees and each had their own version of how America should
fight a war. Such separateness was labeled inefficient, costly, and detrimental for the
prosecution of future wars by then Secretary of War Forrestal and President Truman
(OSD History 1978:23, 29).
Congressional hearings were held in 1944 on the Proposal to Establish a Single
Department of Armed Forces. War Department officials advocated the establishment of
a single Department of the Armed Forces. Navy Department officials urged further study
on the issue. In response, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) established a special committee
for Reorganization of National Defense. Its aim was to “study the most efficient and
practicable organization” of National Defense organizations, namely the Department of
War and the Department of the Navy (Report on Post-War military Policy as quoted by
OSD History 1978). It recommended the establishment of a single Department of the
Armed Forces but the Joint Chiefs never took action.
The Navy launched a separate study, commonly known as the Eberstadt Report,
named after its chairman Ferdinand Eberstadt. It advised against the establishment of a
single defense department. Instead, it advocated the creation of an Air Department and
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the use of joint committees. The report “proposed the establishment of a National
Security Council and a National Security Resources Board supported by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, a Military Munitions Board, and special agencies for intelligence and research”
(OSD History 1978:6). Hearings were again held on the matter but failed to produce a
solution.
Recognizing America’s new role as a world leader, Truman called for a Military
Department where strategic planning, programming, and budgeting can be achieved,
unified training established, and duplication between the Services reduced. The two
services cooperated through the war to do these activities but during peace such
cooperation was not guaranteed. When cooperation could not be obtained, the President
and Congress had to make a decision (Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman
as quoted by OSD History 1978:8-13). President Truman sent a message to Congress
stating that: “there is enough evidence now at hand to demonstrate beyond question the
need for a unified department” (Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman as
quoted by OSD History 1978:8-13). On 13 May 1946, President Truman asked the
Secretaries of War and Navy to reach an agreement. After compromises were made
between the two departments, Truman submitted a draft bill to Congress that had the
approval of both Secretaries and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The bill became Public Law
253, 80th Congress (61 Stat. 495); better known as the National Security Act of 1947.

National Security Act of 1947.
This act made the intent of Congress clear
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…to provide three military departments for the operations and administration of
the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marines
Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to
provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian
control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of
the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their
integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces (National Security
Act of 1947 as quoted by OSD History 1978:36)
To this end, the National Military Establishment was created (see Figure 3).

The President

The National Military Establishment
Headed by the Secretary of Defense (& 3 Assistants)
Joint Chiefs of Staff

War Council

Secretary of the Army

Research & Development Board

Secretary of the Navy

Munitions Board

Secretary of the Air Force

Figure 4. National Military Establishment (Acher 1993:354)
Secretary of Defense.
The Secretary of Defense headed the new organization. The Act detailed the
Secretary of Defense duties as follows:
1) Establish general policies and programs for the National Military Establishment
and for all of the departments and agencies therein.
2) Exercise general direction, authority, and control over such departments and
agencies.
3) Take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the
fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research.
4) Supervise and coordinate the preparation of the budget estimates of the
departments and agencies comprising the National Military Establishment;
formulate and determine the budget estimates for submittal to the Bureau of the
Budget; and supervise the budget programs of such departments and agencies
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under the applicable appropriation Act: PROVIDED, That nothing herein
contained shall prevent the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, or
the Secretary of the Air Force from presenting to the President or the Director of
the Budget, after first so informing the Secretary of Defense, any report or
recommendation relating to his department which he may deem necessary: AND
PROVIDED FURTHER, That the Department of the Army, the Department of the
Navy, and the Department of the Air Force shall be administered as individual
executive departments by their respective Secretaries and all powers and duties
relating to such departments not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of
Defense by this Act shall be retained by each of their respective Secretaries.
(National Security Act of 1947 as quoted by OSD History 1978:40-41)
Take note of the two clauses in the Act that limited the Secretary of Defense’s powers; in
the fourth clause his powers are limited to those specifically granted him, and all other
powers were retained by the Services; secondly, the Services were granted the ability to
appeal decisions to the President or the Director of the Budget. Even if the Secretary had
the Presidential powers over the Services, he did not have the staff to assist him in those
duties. Within the Act, the Secretary of Defense was given a small staff composed of
three assistants, none of whom could be military. He was to perform duties through the
use of several joint agencies, including the War Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Munitions
Board, and Research and Development Board.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
JCS was created to coordinate Army and Navy actions during World War II. In
the Act the duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were as “principal military advisors to the
President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense”
1) To prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the
military forces.
2) To prepare joint logistic plans and the assign to the military services logistic
responsibilities in accordance with such plans.
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3) To establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified
commands are in the interest of national security.
4) To formulate policies for joint training of the military forces.
5) To formulate policies for coordinating the education of members of the
military forces.
6) To review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, in
accordance with strategic and logistic plans.
7) To provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of
the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations. (National Security Act of 1947 as quoted by OSD History
1978:45)
The members of the JCS wore two hats, one as Service Chief, and the other as an advisor
void of service specific blinders. The JCS were ineffective because of this duality. The
JCS had lacked a central figure to decide definitively on a course of action therefore the
President and Congress had to decide for them.
The Munitions Board.
The Munitions Board was “to support the strategic and logistic plans prepared by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff” by performing the following duties.
1) Coordinate…procurement, production, and distribution plans of the
departments and agencies comprising the Establishment.
2) Plan for the military aspects of industrial mobilization.
3) Recommend assignment of procurement responsibilities.
4) Prepare estimates of potential production procurement, and personnel for use
in evaluation of the logistic feasibility of strategic operations.
5) Determine relative priorities of the various segments of the military
procurement programs.
6) Supervise such subordinate agencies as are or may be created to consider the
subjects falling within the scope of the Board’s responsibilities.
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7) Make recommendations to regroup, combine, or dissolve existing interservice agencies operating in the fields of procurement, production, and
distribution in such manner as to promote efficiency and economy.
8) Maintain liaison with other departments and agencies for the proper
correlation of military requirements with the civilian economy, particularly in
regard to the procurement.
9) Assemble and review material and personnel requirements.
(National Security Act of 1947 as quoted by OSD History 1978:46)
Within the Act are words such as supervise, coordinate, and recommend. The Board was
not given overall authority to fulfill their responsibilities.
The Research and Development Board
The Research and Development Board was “to advise the Secretary of Defense as
to the status of scientific research relative to the national security, and to assist him in
assuring adequate provision for research and development on scientific problems relating
to the national security.” According to the Act the Research and Development Board had
the following duties.
1) Prepare a complete and integrated program of research and development for
military purposes.
2) Advise with regard to trends in scientific research relating to national security
and measures necessary to assure continued and increasing progress.
3) Recommend measure of coordination of research and development among the
military departments, and allocation among them of responsibilities for
specific programs of joint interest.
4) Formulate policy for the National Military Establishment in connection with
research and development matters involving agencies outside the National
Military Establishment.
5) Consider the interaction of research and development and strategy, and to
advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection therewith.
(National Security Act of 1947 as quoted by OSD History 1978:47)
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The Act allows the R&D board to advise and recommend only. The Act is criticized for
making the Service representatives on the two boards co-equal to the Chairman of each
Board (Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report as republished in Defense Policy 1988:162).
In effect the R&D Board and the Munitions Board had no command over the Services;
any consolidation of resources in the fields of research and development, procurement,
production, and distribution would require Service agreement and cooperation. The
Board’s recommendations were mostly ignored.
The Air Force.
The Air Force achieved its independence through this Act. As defined by the Act,
the United States Air Force shall include:
aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be
organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and
defensive air operations. The Air Force shall be responsible for the preparation of
the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise
assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the
expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.
(National Security Act of 1947 as quoted by OSD History 1978:45)
The new Department of the Air Force looked to Air Material Command (AMC) to be its
sole “manger of development, testing, procurement, and logistics” (Benson 1996:9).
Unfortunately, AMC was more concerned with preserving and improving the assets
inherited from the Army than developing the next generation of aircraft. Unlike the
Army and the Navy, the Air Force relied heavily on contractors for R&D services rather
then in-house personnel. Contractors and commercial R&D labs presented their products
to Air Force procurement officers in the Engineering Division or the Material Division

- 21 -

within AMC. AMC was supported by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Material stationed in
Washington D.C. (Benson 1996:9-10).
Executive Order 9877.
This executive order was signed by President Truman on the same day that he
signed the National Security Act of 1947. The language used to describe the function of
the DoD and each service contained in the Executive Order, differed from the wording in
the Act. The difference in language was a lightning rod with “the continuing dispute
between the Navy and the Air Force over responsibility for air missions” (U.S. DoD JCS
files as quoted by OSD History 1978:270). In the months to follow, the Joint Chiefs
were employed to hash out an agreement. After four months of discussion, the JCS
reported that they had failed to reach agreements and asked that these issues be “resolved
by higher authority” (U.S. DoD JCS files as quoted by OSD History 1978:275).
Secretary Forrestal then held two meetings with JCS, one lasted five days in Key West,
Florida. The agreement latter became known as the Key West Agreement.
Executive Order 9877 was rescinded by Executive Order 9950, its language
modified to more closely match the language in the Act. In a Memorandum from the
Key West Conference, JCS acquisition role was further defined:
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It is intended that an individual Service is to be permitted to carry through the
development stage any material improvement program or new weapon
development program considered by the Service to be essential in the interest of
increased effectiveness of its weapons, material, or equipment. The ultimate
application and utilization of the product of such a development program shall, of
course, be subject to the examination and recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on the basis of its contributions to the over-all war effort. (OSD History
1978:286)
The JCS was to advise the President on the application of the product but were not to
disturb the Acquisition Process as performed by the Services.
Forrestal Recommendations.
With any new organization, lessons are learned and changes are made. The first
Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal, made recommendations in his first annual
report. It included the following:
1) Create a separate staff for the Secretary of Defense.
2) Provision of an Under Secretary of Defense.
3) Provision of a Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
4) Enlargement of the Joint Staff.
5) Increased Secretary of Defense’s authority over the Military Departments.
6) Removal of the Service Secretaries from membership on the National Security
Council; a body that advised the President directly. (Acker 1993:57)
His recommendation influenced President Truman to commission further study on the
National Military Establishment.
Hoover Commission.
The Hoover Commission formally Commission on Organization of the U.S.
Executive Branch was formed to find ways “to improve operations and to reduce costs”
of the existing organization” (OSD History 1978:65). Within the Hoover Commission
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was created the Committee on the National Security Organization, known as the
Eberstadt Task Force. The Hoover Commission studied the Eberstadt Task Force Report
and adopted its conclusions in six recommendations (see Table 2).
Table 2. Hoover I Recommendations

1) The Secretary of Defense should have full
power over preparation of the budget and
expenditures.
2) The Secretary of Defense should have full
statutory authority now vested in the service
departments and full authority for the
procurement and management of supplies
and material.

4) More adequate and effective relations
should be developed at the working level
among the appropriate committees of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security
Council, Central Intelligence Agency,
Research and Development Board, Munitions
Board, and the National Security Resource
Board.
5) Steps be made to implement the
recommendations made by the Commission
regarding medical departments.

3) The Secretary of Defense should have
powers over military personnel
administration, military education, training,
recruitment, promotion and transfers among
the services. He should also have full
authority to prescribe uniform personnel
policies for civilian and military personnel
throughout the several services.

6) The President should take immediate
steps to prepare for civilian defense.
Emergency plans for civilian and industrial
mobilization should be promptly and
continuously revised. Defenses for
unconventional warfare should be developed.

(The National Security Organization, A Report to Congress as quoted by OSD History 1979:75-77)

President Truman reviewed the proposed changes over the winter of 1948. He
incorporated the Administration’s recommendations in a message to Congress
transmitted on 7 March 1949. In his message, Truman reviewed lessons learned from
World War II and urged congress to strengthen the Secretary of Defense into more then
an administrator limited to specified items into “a fully responsible official with authority
adequate to meet his responsibility, whom the President and the congress can hold
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accountable” (Public papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman as quoted by OSD
History 1979:79)
National Security Act of 1949.
Congress passed a 1949 amendment to the National Security Act and
accomplished the following:
1) Changed the name of the National Military Establishment into the Department
of Defense (DoD).
2) The Secretary of Defense was given a Deputy and three Assistant Secretaries.
3) The Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was created as a non-voting
member, senior in rank to all other military officers. He was to expedite the
JCS business.
4) Increased the Joint Staff from 100 to 210 officers.
5) Made the Department of Defense into an Executive Department. Reduced the
Army, Navy, and Air Force from Executive Departments into Military
Departments under the Department of Defense. Strengthened the Secretary of
Defense’s powers over the three Services’ budgets and the Service members.
He was to provide “direction, authority, and control” over the services. (Jones
1999:323)
6) The Service Secretaries were removed from the National Security Council.
7) Chairmen of the Munitions Board and the R&D Board were given powers of
decision.
8) Services were still “separately administered,” and retained powers to appeal
decisions with the President and Congress even after this act. (Acher
1993:61).
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Figure 5: The Air Force Acquisition Oversight Hierarchy of 1949

Initial organization of oversight activities.
The resultant Acquisition Oversight construct is depicted in Figure 4. The
hierarchy of oversight was finally made clear, yet the process suffered from several
maladies. The Air Force lacked in-house experts capable of harnessing science and
technology for the future, therefore research and development was neglected. The Air
Force focused their efforts on logistical management and building a supply system
separate from the Army. The Air Force lacked support equipment and components and
the expertise to maintain them; therefore it had to rely heavily on the Army. The Air
Force Acquisition Process inherited traits from the Army that were unsuited to the
rapidly changing aircraft technology. An Air Force Historian describes the process as a
“traditional practice of procuring the airframe, engines, navigation aids, fire control
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system, ground equipment, etc., from different sources and then relying on the airframe
manufacturer to fit them together and make them function as a unit” (Benson 1996:1112). Such disconnects led to the expensive practice of post-production reworks
Every Service brought up a type of Acquisition Process that was thick with
bureaucracies, and contracting practices meant to protect it from Congressional reviews
and contractor lawsuits. To protect its budget from cutbacks, each service lobbied
Congress for weapon system funding, often ending in the cannibalization of sister
services for funds. This type of inter-service rivalries lead to “duplication in weapons
development, as the services fought for proprietorship of a specific mission by seeking to
outdo rivals in developing weapons appropriate for that mission” (McNaugher 1989:39).
In the OSD, statutory organizations proved to be ineffective. The Munitions
Board reviewed requirements surfaced by the JCS and issued policies on Acquisition, but
little was enforced or adhered to by the Services. The R&D Board suffered from the
same malady (Jones 1999:325). These boards advised the Secretary of Defense and were
without real power. The Secretary of Defense himself seemed more like a “mediator
between the President and the services and among the services” (Weigley as quoted by
Jones 1999:323). Oversight was provided internally by Air Force officials (Benson
1995:9).
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Decade of Reorganization (1950-1960)

Current affairs forced the Truman Administration to rethink the unhappy
compromise of the National Security Act as amended in 1949. The Korean War lasted
from 1950 to 1953, a war meant to contain communism; it ended in a stalemate at the 49th
parallel. The Soviets successfully tested its first hydrogen bomb in 1953, igniting fears
of nuclear war. The race was on to develop a system capable of delivering the bomb.
Hence the missile crisis era was born. The DoD had to rethink and reorganize to handle
developing threats (Benson 1996:11).
The concept of program manager came into existence around 1950. A program
manager (PM) is defined as “the individual designated…to manage an acquisition
program” (DoD 2003). PMs managed what was known in 1951 as the Weapon System
Project Office (WSPO), a body comprised of representatives from various agencies
involved in developing and operating the system (Benson 1995:12). In 1960, the WSPO
was renamed the System Program Offices (SPO) in recognition of the “growing
importance of C3 [Command, Control and Communications], surveillance, and other
technologies that supported war fighting” (Benson 1996:15).
Related to the PM concept is the idea of a weapons systems approach to
development. This approach integrated the design of the entire weapon system, which
may include the services, facilities, and trained personnel required to operate it besides
the weapon itself (McNaugher 1989:33). A weapon system was defined in 1958 as “the
entire complex of equipment, support facilities, trained manpower, and concept for
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employment necessary to make a weapon system operational” (The Department of
Defense as quoted by Jones 1999:327).
Reorganization of the Air Force.
The Air Force acknowledged the need for R&D by creating the Research and
Development Command on 23 January 1950. It was composed of the Research,
Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) components of AMC and named the
Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) (Benson 1995:11). The ARDC “did
not assume formal responsibilities for weapon development until 1951” (McNaugher
1989:35). In 1953, the Air Force established a Special Assistant for Research and
Development as part of the Secretariat; the position was redesignated Assistant Secretary
for Research and Development in 1955. At the same time, the Air Staff created a new
Deputy Chief of Staff position for Development with “directorates for R&D and
Requirements” (Benson 1995:11) (see Figure 6). AMC continued to handle procurement
and logistics under the purview of the Assistant Secretary for Material
Separation of development and procurement into two major commands with
parallel reporting channels and loyalties hindered the management of a MDAP. To
decrease conflicts, development programs would start under direction of ARDC and then
“transfer of program management responsibility from ARDC to AMC” would occur “at
the time of a production decision” (Benson 1996:12). Testing was performed by the Air
Proving Ground Command (APGC) or operational units prior to the production phase.
The Air Proving Ground Command was decommissioned in 1958 for the purposes of
reducing expenditures. In its place the Air Force employed the contractor, ARDC test
centers, and operational units to perform testing.
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Reorganization of the Department of Defense.
In a letter to President Truman dated 18 November 1952, former Secretary of
Defense Robert Lovett outlined some weaknesses in the organization of the DoD.
1) The Secretary of Defense is required “to make use of inter-service Committees
for much of his staff work” and is prohibited from “having a military staff.” As a
result, the Secretary of Defense will be “unable to handle the distribution of
shortages in an efficient and direct fashion.”
2) The Act provides that the three services be “separately administered” yet be under
the “direction, authority and control” of the Secretary of Defense. In the fields of
supply, warehousing, and issue the Secretary of Defense has encountered
resistance to unification and efficiency.
3) The three statutory agencies: JCS, the Munitions Board, and the Research and
Development Board all suffer from the three weaknesses.
a. “excessive rigid statutory prescriptions of functions
b. rigid statutory composition
c. the requirements in the statute that each agency perform functions
inappropriate, if not actually impossible, for it to perform efficiently and
expeditiously.”
4) The language in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, does not make
clear whether or not the JCS are directly under the Secretary of Defense.
5) The two boards “compels three of the four members to sit as judges on their own
requests and to pass on estimates of production, on schedules, and on
procurement and distributing systems for which they are each responsible in a
separately administered Service.”
6) There is ambiguity in the lines of authority and responsibility that can be
eliminated by abolishing the two boards and establishing under secretaries within
OSD to perform acquisition functions. (Source: Press Release as quoted by OSD
History 1978:115-126)
Several of these concerns were readdressed by the Committee on Department of Defense
Organization, more commonly known as the Rockefeller Committee, named so after its
chairman, Nelson A. Rockefeller.
Rockefeller Committee.
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In 1953 the Committee on Department of Defense Organization Report pointed
out three weaknesses in the roles performed by DoD personnel. They were as follows:
1) Each service had developed roles, missions, and acquisition priorities separate
from another. Therefore, Services engaged in competition for funding of new
weapons for potentially overlapping even competing missions and roles.
2) JCS members were Service loyal in their recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense. Also their responsibilities did not include presenting an integrated,
strategic plan for national defense.
3) The Secretary of Defense spent too much time detangling inter-Service
disputes and too little on generating integrated military policies. (Acker
1993:66)
Changes recommended by the Committee include 1) the Secretary of Defense making
greater use of the three military department Secretaries and the Armed Forces Policy
Council and 2) the JCS delegating administrative duties down, and increasing the number
of Assistant Secretaries from three to nine (one of them being the Assistant Secretary
(R&D)) (see Table 3). President Eisenhower reviewed the Rockefeller Committee
Report and submitted his recommendations to Congress on 30 April 1953.
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Table 3. Rockefeller Committee Recommendations
1) The direction, authority, and control of
the Secretary of Defense over all agencies
within the Department should be
confirmed.
2) “The Secretaries of the military
departments, subject to the direction,
authority, and control of the Secretary of
Defense, should be the operating heads of
their respective departments in all aspects.”
3) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to more
effectively work as a unified planning
agency, should work closely with the
Secretary of Defense, delegate their less
important duties, and be allowed to
organize the Joint Staff as necessary.
Unified Commands should be assigned to a
military department instead of to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.

4) “The Secretary of Defense should use
the Armed Forces Policy Council as his
principal advisory group on major
problems of policy in which he requires
both civilian and military advice.”
5) The Secretary of Defense should “be
free to adjust from time to time the
assignment of staff functions within his
own office in a flexible and expeditious
manner.” Therefore the two boards
created by statute should be abolished and
additional Assistant Secretaries authorized
to take their place.
6) Military personnel in OSD should
receive equal opportunity and
consideration as those outside OSD.

(Report of the Rockefeller Committee as quoted by OSD History 1979:128-149)

Reorganization Plan No. 6.
President Eisenhower took office in 1953 and immediately called for DoD
reorganization to further strengthen the Secretary of Defense. He abolished the
Munitions and R&D Boards with his Reorganization Plan No. 6 effective 30 June 1953
(see Figure 5). This happened after several congressional investigations into the two
boards.
One fault cited was ‘that each member, except for the chairman, was both a
claimant and a judge of his own requests’ making it ‘extremely difficult, if not
impossible’ at times of serious shortages of materiel and manpower [to scale back
or eliminate a weapon from the acquisition process] (Kintner, as quoted by Jones
1999:350).

- 32 -

Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Research and Engineering

Advised
by JCS

Assistant Secretary of Supply and

Secretary of the Air Force

Assistant Secretary for
Research and Development

Assistant Secretary
for Material
Air Force Chief of Staff

Deputy Chief of Staff
for Development

Air Research &
Development Command

Deputy Chief of Staff for Material

Air Proving Ground
Command

Air Material Command

Development Divisions
Program
Management
Transfers
Program Managers

Air Material Areas

Depots

Program Manager

Figure 6: The Air Force Acquisition Oversight Hierarchy of 1955
In the place of the two boards President Eisenhower designated the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Supply and Logistics) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D). The
Assistant Secretary positions were devised as purely advisory, but their strategic
relationship to the Secretary of Defense often put them in direct control over weapons
acquisitions (Bair 1994:9).
Also included in the Reorganization Plan No. 6 were the following: the
appointment of a Director of Joint Staff, a General Council and six additional Assistant
Secretaries of Defense; strengthen the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
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by allowing him voting rights; and providing that the Chairman of JCS be appointed by
the Secretary of Defense and President, not by members of the JCS as previously agreed
to in the West Keys Agreement. Neither the House nor the Senate took adverse actions
against this plan within the 60 day window and the plan went into effect 30 June 1953.
Hoover II.
On 10 July 1953 a new Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government, more commonly known as the Second Hoover Commission was
established to “promote economy, efficiency, and improved services in the transaction of
the public business” (Comments on the Hoover Commission Report as quoted by
Defense Policy 1988:8). The Commission completed its report after two years; it
contained 19 recommendations to improve the DoD as seen in Table 4.
Being proactive the DoD merged the Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D) and
Applications Engineering into the Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D) in 1957. In a
letter to Congress Secretary of Defense Wilson summarized the DoD response to the
Second Hover Commission. In regards to role clarification, coordination efforts were
redoubled and lines of authority better clarified. In regards to improving management of
common supply and service activities, DoD launched the Single Manager Plan which
provided a Single Manager in a designated area from procurement through distribution.
This program acts in lieu of a civilian controlled supply agency. On the other
recommendations, the Secretary of Defense fully agreed with the recommendations.
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Table 4. Hoover II Recommendations
1) The Secretary of Defense should create
a civilian position with authority over
military requirements

10) The supply agency’s director should be
appointed by the President.
11) The Secretary of Defense should make
semi-annual reports on supply and logistics
to Congress.

2) The Secretary of Defense should
regroup functions under Assistant
Secretaries for logistics, research and
development, personnel and finance.

12) Laws should be changed and incentives
increased to attract and hold able
administrators.

3) The Secretary of Defense should
appoint a principal career assistant for each
Assistant Secretary.

13) Military and Civilian personnel should
be better positioned to optimize utilization.

4) Service Secretaries should have similar
Assistant Secretaries in Recommendation
2.

14) Support manager roles should be
defined.

5) Chiefs of Staff should relate to support
activities as planners, requesters, and users.

15) Standards of manager selection, training,
promotion and compensation should be
uniform.

6) Departmental Assistant Secretaries for
should control supply and service activities

16) Military Secretaries should use the
career management program in activities
under them.

7) Departmental Assistant Secretaries for
Research and Development (R&D) should
have clear responsibility for coordinating
R&D.

17) DoD should improve management over
budgets, working capital funds, and
inventory.

8) A separate civilian-managed common
supply agency should be established

18) Departmental Assistant Secretaries for
Financial Management (FM) should screen
requirements and review budgets

9) The supply agency should have a
strictly supporting role for the agency.

19) Laws should be passed to give
secretaries in Recommendation 18 exclusive
control of FMs
(US Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch as quoted by OSD History
1979:164-165)
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The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.
This Act provided that the Services were to be “separately organized” versus the
language “separately administered” used in previous acts. The Secretary of Defense was
given stronger powers to better define the Services respective roles and missions.
Administrative duties of the Secretary of Defense were absorbed by assistant secretaries.
Assistant Secretaries could now give orders regarding their respective areas of
responsibilities provided such orders first go through the Service Secretaries (Acker
1993:71). Specifically, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D) was upgraded to
Director of Defense Research and Engineering. The Director was given specific powers
over weapons acquisition (Benson 1995:14). This act separated the Operation
Commands from the Service to have a user and supplier relationship. Each Service was
to provide training, support, and logistics to operational commands who were directed by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the command of the Secretary of Defense.
Establishment of the Advanced Research Projects Agency in 1958.
On 4 October 1957 the Soviets successfully launched Sputnik I.
The world's first artificial satellite was about the size of a basketball, weighed
only 183 pounds, and took about 98 minutes to orbit the Earth on its elliptical
path. That launch ushered in new political, military, technological, and scientific
developments. While the Sputnik launch was a single event, it marked the start of
the space age and the U.S.-U.S.S.R space race. (NASA 2003)
On 3 November 1957 the Soviets successfully launched Sputnik II which had a larger
payload. President Eisenhower warned the American people how the Soviet’s
achievements threatened national security. He stated “that any new missile or related
program hereafter originated will, whenever practicable, be put under a single manager
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and administered without regard to the separate services” (Public Papers of the
Presidents: Eisenhower as quoted by OSD History 1979:171).
On 7 January 1958 President Eisenhower requested $10 million for the formation
of an Advanced Research Projects Agency. Secretary of Defense McElroy explained that
it would be a separate agency that would “manage new weapon programs during the
early stages of research and exploratory development” (Hearings on the Ballistic Missile
Program as quoted by OSD History 1979:172). President Eisenhower signed Public law
85-325 that said in part
The Secretary or his designee is authorized to perform assigned research and
development projects: by contract with private business entities, educational or
research institutions, or other agencies of the Government, through one or more of
the military departments, or by utilizing employees and consultants of the
Department of Defense.
The Secretary of Defense shall assign any weapons systems developed to such
military department or departments for production and operational control as he
may determine. (Public law 85-325 72 Stat. 11 as quoted by OSD history
1979:173)
The Advance Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was chartered on 7 February 1958. It
was “to explore new technologies ‘in an objective and detached manner’ that precluded
the services ‘from acquiring proprietary interest in their projects’” (McNamara 1989:41).
It was renamed Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in 1972.
Conclusion of Decade.
The Secretary of Defense started the decade as an arbitrator between Services.
After all the reorganization acts, his role became one of Armed Forces manager and sole
advisor to the President in matters of Defense. In the area of acquisition, the Secretary of
Defense had no say in 1947 but emerged from the decade with increased powers. He
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now had the power to cancel and transfer Service programs and their appropriations. He
had a budget line item, direct from Congress, to conduct R&D programs at the DoD
level. In essence, the Secretary of Defense had authority over all aspects of acquisition;
that of research, development and procurement. Services were to give OSD staff their
“full cooperation” (Acker 1993:66). Research and development gained structure as
Assistant Secretaries were given administrative powers over the development of new
technologies for the purpose of incorporating them into military hardware. Over the
decade, the Acquisition Process accumulated layers of oversight and a library of
acquisition doctrine (McNaugher 1989:35).
Oversight in 1959 existed as depicted in Figure 6. The PM, supported by the
SPO, markets a development program before higher levels of Air Force and DoD.
Problems of inter-service rivalries, duplication of efforts, and other inefficiencies
continued to plague the DoD. Pentagon and OSD decision makers were engaged daily
for point-on-point system analysis thereby elongating the Acquisition Process. One
historian notes that acquisition program information surfaced to higher levels was often
incomplete and unsuited for milestone decisions (Benson 1996:16).
Concern over cost overruns, performance short-comings, and missed deadlines
prompted the new Kennedy Administration to undertake a major review and
overhaul of the weapons acquisition process. The solution, according to the
prevailing view, was to adopt a more business-like approach. Secretary of
Defense McNamara, the former president of the Ford Motor Co., brought just that
kind of experience and management philosophy to the Pentagon job. (Defense
Policy 1988:10)
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Figure 7: The Air Force Acquisition Oversight Hierarchy of 1959

Era of McNamara (1961 – 1968)

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara served from 1961 to 1968, the longest
of any other Secretary. He is credited with bringing order and standardization to
acquisition management (McNaugher 1989:63). He centralized control over budget
matters, reduced redundant acquisition programs, and further refined the acquisition
process through the introduction of business concepts.
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Secretary McNamara brought to fruition the budget overhaul called for by the
first Hoover Commission.
McNamara sought and instituted a quantitative budgeting system to match his
view of military strategy and policy that bridged planning and programming,
often disconnected in the past, while flexible enough to link priorities and
requirements. (Jones 1999:328)
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) centered on “out year”
requirements as outlined in a Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP). He authored the strategic
forces program category, which, unlike previous budgetary methods that grouped
acquisition programs by service, grouped acquisition programs by similar capabilities. In
theory, comparisons between bombers, fighters, and missiles could be made across
services and the program with the greatest value would win a budget, the others being
terminated or delayed.
Using the refined arts of systems analysis (or cost-effectiveness analysis), and
operations research, Secretary McNamara terminated several weapons projects in the
interest of reducing acquisition cost and eliminating redundancies.
These choices were often made in the face of stiff political opposition.
McNamara often incurred the wrath of a particular services as well as members of
Congress interested in particular projects. (McNaugher 1989:55)
He formed the Office of System Analysis to perform cost-effectiveness studies and
encouraged the Services to do likewise. A new position of Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Systems Analysis) was established on 10 September 1965.
Canceling programs was easier then trying to get Services to change methods.
That is to move “away from allowing weapons projects to proliferate and toward fewer
but more important and strategically appropriate development programs” (McNaugher
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1989:58). President Kennedy supported a flexible response military strategy which was
drastically different from the mass retaliation supported in past administrations (Jones
1999:332). Secretary McNamara was hard pressed to get the Services to write
requirements for more conventional weapons in lieu of nuclear weapons and therefore
found himself and his staff in the business of writing requirements for the Services
(McNaugher 1989:59). His best efforts to control the Acquisition Process drew political
fire. Towards the end of his tenure, Service Chiefs made greater use of their rights to
address Congress directly per the National Security Act of 1947 as amended. With
Congressional help, Service Chiefs limited Secretary McNamara’s powers (McNaugher
1989:54).
Late in his tenure Secretary McNamara introduced the concept of “Total Package
Procurement” that gave system contractors the responsibility to submit developmental
and production costs of system as well as estimate some operational costs (McNaugher
1989:62). This concept greatly increased the “proliferation of detailed proposals, studies,
and paper competitions, followed up by reports, audits, program reviews, and other
oversight tools” (Benson 1996:16). Technology advances at unpredictable speeds and in
divergent directions such that assigning a hard target for budget and schedule led to
unrealistic bids and paper promises. Total Package Procurement was abandoned after
1966 because it was out of touch with the realities of both the uncertainty inherent in
technology development and the ability of defense industrial base to absorb the cost of
unknowns (Jones 1999:329).

Other concepts conceived by McNamara are still in
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use in various forms, including: value engineering; information systems for
planning and control of schedules and costs; technical data management; proposal
evaluation and source selection; defense standardization; improved quality
assurance; configuration management; work breakdown structure; and integrated
logistics support for systems and equipment (Jones 1999:329).
For more information on these concepts see Acher’s book Acquiring Defense Systems: A
Quest for the best.
Reorganization.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics) was combined with the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Properties and Installations) in 1961 to form the position
of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics). The Air Force realigned
their assets and established management structures parallel to DoD (see Figure 7).
ARDC became the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) with the procurement powers
previously attributed the AMC on 1 April 1961. In turn, AMC became the Air Force
Logistics Command (AFLC), now solely responsible for Logistics (Benson 1996:15).
“At a mutually agreed time after deployment, a program management responsibility
transfer (PMRT) between an AFSC product division and an AFLC logistic center would
occur” (Benson 1996:16).
AFSC and the newly formed Office of Aerospace Research handled R&D matters
for the Service (Jones 1999:363). In 1962, the Deputy Chief of Staff (Material) and
(Development) were combined into the Deputy Chief of Staff (Systems and Logistics)
who would provide guidance to the two Major Commands. Also created was a Deputy
Chief of Staff for Research and Technology to oversee technologies not specific to a
particular weapons system (Jones 1999:363). MDAP “managers in the field were to use
‘red line’ procedures to report directly to system offices in the Pentagon for decisions by

- 42 -

a Systems Review Board” (Benson 1996:15). In 1966, the SPOs were realigned under
new divisions; “Aeronautical Systems Division, Armament Division, Electronic Systems
Division, Space Systems Division, Ballistic Missile Division, and Aerospace Medial
Division” (Benson 1995:16).
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Figure 8: The Air Force Acquisition Oversight Hierarchy of 1964
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Oversight Outgrowth (1969 – 1977)

America’s public and its legislators were becoming disenchanted with the
Vietnam War and the military’s role in increasing the National Deficit. Congress made
the Defense budget a primary target for budget cuts. To better understand acquisition
costs, Congress passed Public Law 94-106 mandating System Acquisition Reports
(SARs) be submitted by DoD at the end of each quarter to provided official data on the
status of all MDAPs in April of 1969 (Acker 1993:151).
Packard Initiatives.
Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard responded with ten initiatives aimed
at improving weapons acquisition first published in 1970 (see Table 5). Secretary
Packard called for several changes to make DoD more business-like.
New policies included…more realistic cost estimates, more precisely defined
operational requirements, technical risk analyses, less concurrency in favor of
sequential schedules, a return to the practice of building prototypes, and for
aircraft, competitive fly-offs between contractors. (Benson 1995:17)
He established the Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC), later to be
renamed the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) in 1987 (Srull 1998:5). This new body
would review MDAPs at milestone points and advise the Assistant Secretary of Defense
on the MDAP status and readiness. Among the members of the DSARC were: as
Chairman the Director, Defense Research and Engineering; the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Installations and Logistics), (Systems Analysis), and (Comptroller) (Srull
1998:6). The Air Force response was to create an Air Force System Review Council
(AFSARC) as well as support panels to help keep track of MDAP progress (Benson
1995:19).
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Table 5. Packard Initiatives
Improve the quality of information
available from development.

Restore competition to weapons
acquisition.

1) Use more hardware testing.

8) Reduce risk and stimulate contractor
efforts during development .

2) Establish Operational Test and
Evaluation agencies separate from
developing commands
3) establish the Cost Analysis
Improvement Group (CAIG) within OSD
to improve the quality of cost estimates
during development.
Enhance program flexibility.
4) Practice “design-to-cost”
5) Account for all “life-cycle costs”
6) Strengthen PM independence and
lengthen their tenures.

9) Prime-contractor competition through
full-scale development to avoid developer
monopoly at the time the initial production
contract is negotiated.
-- Regulate the OSD’s involvement in
acquisition.
10) Establish a Defense System
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC). It
shall meet to approve the start of
development (DSARC I), meet again to
decide on full-scale development (DSARC
II), and meets a third time to approve the
move to production.

7) Reduce production concurrency…fly
before you buy
(As summarized by McNaugher 1989:67-68)

The Fitzhugh Commission.
The practice of concurrency, that is putting weapons into production prior to
flight testing, yielded weapons that did not perform as advertised. “In a sample of 22
weapon systems deployed to Southeast Asia [Vietnam] from 1965-1970, DoD studies
found all but one had suffered major deficiencies in the field” (Benson 1996:17). In the
midst of an unpopular war, battered by unfavorable analysis, and faced with acquisition
cost overruns, the Nixon Administration commissioned a new study called the Blue
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Ribbon Defense Panel headed by Gilbert Fitzhugh on July 1969, more commonly known
as the Fitzhugh Commission.
The 16 member panel took a year to publish their findings (OSD History
1978:249). This panel was “instructed to study, report, and make recommendations on
the organization and management of the Department of Defense” with a greater emphasis
on the Acquisition Process then the two Hoover Commission (Defense Policy 1988:144).
The panel’s report contained 113 recommendations (OSD History 1978:249). One
finding relating to the acquisition oversight states “the diffusion of responsibility and
accountability, the freedom to ‘pass the buck’ to the top on hard decisions, and the
opportunity to use the extensive coordination process to advance parochial objectives, are
circumstances to which many in the Department have adapted comfortably” (Barrett
1983:xxiv). The need for accountability seems to pervade the Fitzhugh Commission
Recommendations. Table 6 charts findings and recommendations pertaining to the
Acquisition Process.
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Table 6. Fitzhugh Commission Recommendations
1) Decentralized Authority:
Observation: Effective civilian
control is impaired by the generally
excessive centralization of decisionmaking authority at the level of the
Secretary of Defense.
Recommendation: The functions
of the Department of Defense should
be divided into three major groupings:
Operations, Resource Management,
and Evaluation…Each of these major
groups should report to the Secretary
of Defense through a separate Deputy
Secretary

4) Research and Development:
Recommendation: A new
development policy for weapons
systems and other hardware should be
formulated and promulgated to cause a
reduction of technical risks through
demonstrated hardware before fullscale development, and to provide the
needed flexibility in acquisition
strategies.
5) Program and Project Management
Recommendation: The
effectiveness of program or project
management should be improved by:
a) Establishing a career specialty
code for Program managers in
each Military Service and
developing selection and training
criteria that will ensure the
availability of an adequate
number of qualified officers. The
criteria should emphasize
achieving a reasonable balance
between the needs for knowledge
of operational requirements and
experience in management;
b) Increasing the use of trained
civilian personnel as program
managers;
c) Providing authority
commensurate with the assigned
responsibility and more direct
reporting lines for program
managers, particularly those
operating in matrix organizational
arrangements; and
d) Giving the Program Manager
directive authority, subject to
applicable laws and regulations,
over the contracting officer, and
clarifying the fact that the contract
auditor acts in an advisory role.

2) Operational Test and Evaluation
(OT&E):
Observation: OT&E has been too
infrequent, poorly designed and
executed, and generally inadequate.
Recommendation: A Defense Test
Agency should be created to perform
the functions of overview of all
Defense test and evaluation, … with
particular emphasis on operational
testing, and on systems and
equipments which span Service lines
3) Career and Professional Development:
Observation: The promotion and
rotation systems of the Military
Services do not facilitate career
development in the technical and
professional activities,
Recommendation: Specialist
career should be established for
officers in such staff, technical and
professional fields as research,
development, intelligence,
communications, automatic data
processing and procurement…the
duration of assignments for officers
should be increased, and should be as
responsive to the requirements of the
job as to the career plan of the officer.

(As summarized in Defense Policy 1988:10-13)
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The first recommendation was never acted upon. In response to the second
recommendation, President Nixon created the Independent Operational Test and
Evaluation (IOT&E) organizations in 1970. These organizations were to help ensure
weapons deployed to the field worked for the Warfighter. The Air Force formed the Air
Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) in 1974 (Benson 1995:18).
AFOTEC findings were to be used by the DSARC in performing oversight.
On the third, forth and fifth recommendations, Secretary Packard laid the
foundations for the 1971 publication of DoD Directive 5000 series, officially entitled
“Acquisition for Major Defense Systems” (Acker 1993:169). This document unified and
formalized Acquisition policy across the Services. Secretary Packard required the
Director, Defense Research and Engineering to conduct “a management review at least
once during” each MDAP’s life (Acker 1993:167). Improving OSD management was the
focus of these reviews.
The Commission on Government Procurement.
Coinciding with the Fitzhugh Commission, Congress established the Commission
on Government Procurement in November 1969 to study and recommend methods “to
promote the economy, efficiency and effectiveness” of procurement by the executive
branch of the Federal Government (Defense Policy 1988:390). The 12 member
commission submitted their report in December 1972. The recommendations pertinent to
the Acquisition Process and the Acquisition Oversight Process are listed in Table 7.
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Table 7. Commission on Government Procurement Recommendations

1) General Procurement Considerations:
a. Finding: Void in policy leadership and
responsibility and a fragmented and
outmoded statutory base.
Recommendation: create the Office of
Federal Procurement Policy within the
Office of Management and Budget.
b. Finding: The military procurement is
govern by the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947, but civilian
procurement came under the Federal
Property and Administrative Services act
of 1949. There are inconsistencies
between the two statutes.
Recommendation: Enact legislation to
eliminate inconsistencies
c. Finding: There is a burdensome mass
and maze of regulations
Recommendation: Establish a system of
Government-wide coordinated, and
uniform procurement regulations under
the direction of the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy.
2) Research and Development Acquisition:
a. Recommendation: Emphasis should be
placed on basic, innovative research and
the sharing of new ideas among
Government agencies. There should be
more cooperative industry-Government
relationship which maximizes the
creative energies of U.S. suppliers.
b. Finding: In cost allowability principles,
the independent research and
development (IR&D) and bind and
proposal (B&P) expenditures are in the
Nation’s best interest to promote
competition, to advance technology, and
to foster economic growth
Recommendation: Establish a policy
recognizing IR&D and B&P efforts as
necessary costs of doing business.

3) Acquisition of Major Systems
a. Finding: too often the focus has been on
the system product and not on its
purpose…adequate attention [is not
given] to why and new level of
capability is needed.
Recommendation: Start new system
acquisition programs with agency head
statements of needs and goals.
b. Finding: Funds spent on development of
alternative systems serve as insurance
against the possibility of a premature and
potentially costly choice involving only
one system.
Recommendation:
i) Create alternative system
candidates;
ii) Finance the exploration of
alternative systems; and
iii) Maintain competition between
contractor exploring alternative
systems.
c. Finding: The cost to maintain
competition throughout rises
substantially. Thus, systems entering
production and deployment normally do
so under an evolved monopoly situation,
with only a single system and contractor
to meet the need.
Recommendation: Procuring Agencies
and Congress should withhold approval
for full production and use of new
systems until the need has been
reconfirmed and system performance has
been tested and evaluated in an
environment closely approximating the
operational conditions.
d. Recommendation: Alleviate the problem
of management layering and excessive
staff reviews;
e. Recommendation: Strengthen each
agency’s cost estimating capability

(As summarized by Defense Policy 1988:13-17)
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The Office of Federal Procurement Policy was created by statue in 1974 in
fulfillment of Recommendation 1a. (Defense Policy 1988:14). To combat complaints
that unrealistic cost data was being used for oversight and in fulfillment of
recommendation 3e, the OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) came into
existence in 1971. The CAIG was to perform independent cost analysis for the use of
DSARC (Srull 1998:5). The other recommendations were addressed by later
commissions and reports.
DoD Organizational Changes.
Several organizations changed their names in the 1970s. The only new agency to
the Oversight Hierarchy was the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. Established
in 1970, he heads Office of Operational Test and Evaluation (see Figure 8). The Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) position was abolished in 1977 with
acquisition activities transferred to the Director of Defense Research and Engineering
and other responsibilities assigned to the new Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower,
Reserve Affairs and Logistics). The Director of Defense Research and Engineering was
redesignated Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) by Public law 95140 in 1977. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) was redesignated four
times: to Director of Defense Program Analysis and Evaluation in 1973; to Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) in 1974; to Director of Planning
and Evaluation in 1976; and lastly to Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis
and Evaluation) in 1977 (US Organization 1998:33-36).
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The creation of DSARC and AFSARC increased the number of participants in the
Acquisition Process. Program Managers were forced to brief, not only their chain of
command, but also all the member organizations represented in DSARC and AFSARC.
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Figure 9: The Air Force Acquisition Oversight Hierarchy of 1977
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Air Force Organizational Changes.
Acquisition and Logistics were still handled by two different major commands.
The program management responsibility transfer (PMRT) between AFSC and AFLC was
ineffective and MDAPs suffered from the discontinuity. Air Staff established the
Acquisition Logistics Division in 1976; an oversight organization meant to “ensure that
reliability, maintainability, and supportability were built into weapon systems” by
overseeing acquisition programs in AFSC’s product divisions (Benson 1996:19).

Reducing Service Oversight (1977-1988)

President Carter came into office promising a cut in Defense spending. He cut
President Ford’s 1978 budget proposal for defense by $3 million. Instead of decreased
spending, Defense spending generally increased each year after because of high inflation
at home and serious challenges internationally. In December of 1979 the Soviets invaded
Afghanistan and made it part of its Soviet Bloc.
In November 1979, Iranian revolutionaries occupied the U.S. embassy in Tehran
and took more than 50 hostages. The planned rescue operation ended in failure
and the loss of eight U.S. servicemen on 24-25 April 1980. Not until the last day
of his administration, on 20 January 1981, could President Carter make final
arrangements for the release of the hostages. (Defense Link 2003: Brown)
Faced with these issues, the Carter Administration concentrated on issues abroad and did
little to alter the DoD organizational structure or Acquisition Process.
President Reagan enjoyed peace and prosperity during his two terms in office. He
achieved peace through strength; the DoD budget was increased by 35%; improved
relations with the Soviet culminated with a treaty to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear
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missiles; and he maintained a strong military presence in the Persian Gulf to keep oil
shipping lines open despite hostilities in the Iran-Iraq War (The White House
2004:Reagan). Despite these successes, Defense watchdogs were prevalent in the
1980’s. Prompted by outside concerns or other factors, Congress formed a bipartisan 80member Military Reform Caucus in the late 1970’s. Its aim was to slash waste and
discourage abuse of defense dollars. “Public interest groups such as the Project on
Military Procurement led by crusader Dina Rasor” and “investigative television programs
such as CBS’s ‘60 Minutes’ frequently exposed alleged DoD weapons boondoggles”
(Jones 1999:400). Allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse were prevalent in popular
media.
The Carlucci Initiatives.
The Regan administration recognized a need to study and fix the acquisition
system. In 1981, then Secretary of Defense Weinberger ordered his Deputy Secretary of
Defense Frank C. Carlucci to study all aspects of defense acquisition. Officially called
the Acquisition Improvement Task Force, it published 32 initiatives, more commonly
known as the Carlucci Initiatives (see Table 8). A majority of these initiatives were
implemented, adopted, or adapted (Benson 1996:19 and Jones 1999:406).
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Table 8. Carlucci Initiatives
1) Reaffirm Acquisition Management
Principles
2) Increase use of Preplanned Product
Improvement
3) Implement multiyear procurement
4) Increase program stability
5) Encourage capital investment to enhance
productivity
6) Budget to most likely costs
7) Use economical production rates
8) Assure appropriate contract type
9) Improve system support and readiness
10) Reduce administrative costs and time
11) Budget for technological risk
12) Provide front-end funding for test
hardware
13) Reduce governmental legislation related
to acquisition
14) Reduce number of DoD Directives
15) Enhance funding flexibility
16) Provide contractor incentives to improve
reliability.

17) Decrease DSARC briefing and data
requirements
18) Budget for inflation
19) Forecast business base conditions
20) Improve source selection process
21) Develop and use standard operation and
support systems
22) Provide more appropriate design-tocost-goals
23) Implement acquisition process decisions
24) Reduce number of DSARC milestones
25) Submit MENS with Service POM
26) Revise DSARC membership
27) Retain USDR&E as Defense
Acquisition Executive
28) Raise dollar threshold for DSARC
review
29) Integrate DSARC and PPBS process
30) Increase PM visibility of support
resources
31) Improve reliability and support
32) Increase use of competition

(As summarized by Holbrook 2003:10)

The Grace Commission.
In June 1982, President Reagan established the President’s Private Sector Survey
on Cost Controls (PPSSCC), better known as the Grace Commission. The 45 members
representing 21 private sector companies evaluated 36 segments of the Department of
Defense under the guidance of J. Peter Grace. President Reagan directed the Grace
Commission to “identify opportunities for increased efficiency and reduced costs
achievable by executive action or legislation” (PPSSCC report as quoted by Defense
Policy 1988:596). The Grace Commission applauded several of the Carllucci Initiatives
but maintained that improvements in the Acquisition Process could still be made. See
Table 9 for a summary of their findings.
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Table 9. Grace Commission Recommendations
1) Improved Organization
Observation: Massive duplication of
effort among the services and OSD
Recommendation: Total consolidation
of day-to-day acquisition functions at the
OSD level.
2) Defense Contract Administration
Consolidation
Observation: Wide variations in the
procedures between the Defense
Contract Administration Service…and
the various related components at the
service level.
Recommendation: Consolidate all
contract administration at the OSD-level.
3) Regulatory Constraints
Observation: The Department of
Defense acquisition of weapons systems
operates under a complex regulatory
system.
Recommendation: Defense Acquisition
Regulations (DAR) should be replaced
with general guidelines for DoD
procurement actions.
4) Independent Research and Development
Costs
Observation: The DoD reimbursement
policy for independent research and
development (IR&D) costs involves an
elaborate and time-consuming technical
review process.
Recommendation: Eliminate technical
review and group IR&D under overhead
costs.
5) Department of Defense Laboratories
Recommendation: Improve data
exchange,…reduce duplication, and
DoD laboratories should phase out their
involvement in the late stages of the
development cycle.

6) Common Parts and Standards
Recommendation: Use standardized
parts in weapons systems and decrease
the use of military specifications.
7) Major Weapons System new Starts
Recommendation: Limit the number of
new weapons programs started each year
and impose stricter entry requirements
for new systems.
8) Estimating Weapons systems Costs
Recommendation: Establish procedures
to ensure more accurate estimates of
weapons cost in order to permit better
planning and reduce cost overruns.
9) Instability of the Weapons Acquisition
Process
Recommendation: The DoD should
commit to a stable 5-year spending plan
for the acquisition of weapons systems at
economical production rates
10) Transfer of Consumable Inventory Items
Observation: DLA has proven its ability
to manage successfully consumable
items with statistically superior results
over services.
Recommendation: Of the 1.2 million
inventories being managed by the
Services, 900,000 should be transferred
to DLA.
11) Implementation of OMB Circular A-76
Recommendation: Remove various
legislative requirements that serve to
restrict DoD’s implementation of the A76 program. Thereby outsource
commercial functions.

(Summarized from Defense Policy 1988:17-20)
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The Packard Commission.
On 15 July 1985, President Reagan established the President’s Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management, more commonly known as the Packard
Commission after its chairman David Packard. Table 10 summarizes the main points.
President Regan began to implement the Packard Commission recommendations prior to
the Commission’s final report. On 1 April 1986, President Regan issued National
Security Decision Directive 219 which established an Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition) “to set policy for and oversee program management through the new
Service Acquisition Executives (SAE) and a number of high level committees with
interlocking membership” (Benson 1996:21). He became the Defense Acquisition
Executive (DAE). The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) replaced DSARC in its
responsibilities. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) was established
within the offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to define requirements and select programs
for development. The Packard Commission and the resultant reform measures were seen
as managerial fixes to political problem woven into the organization itself.
In organizational politics terms, the Packard reforms—in conjunction with other
events and developments of the time—produced a net decline in OSD’s capacity
to influence the…process. (Jones 1999:403)

In the first Bush administration, Secretary of Defense Dick Chaney would order the
implementation, in whole or in part, all the Packard recommendations through such
initiatives as the Defense Management Review.
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Table 10. Packard Commission Recommendations
Institutionalize, expand, and link a series
of critical determinations within the
Executive Branch and Congress.
1) National Security Council (NSC) issues
national security objectives.
2) President issues a five-year budget with
input from NSC and the Office of
Management and Budget.
3) Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff
(CJCS) prepares a military strategy and
budget priorities
4) Department of Defense (DoD) generates
a five year defense plan and a two-year
defense budget based on budget level
and programs chosen by the President.
5) The President presents the budget to
congress based on national strategy and
operational concepts.
Military Organization and Command
1) Make CJCS principal uniformed military
advisor to the President, NSC, and
Secretary of Defense.
2) Joint Staff and the office of JCS are
exclusively directed by the CJCS.
3) Correspondence to the Commanders-inChief of the Unified and Specified
Commands (CINCs) goes through the
CJCS.
4) Create a Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
5) Reduce Military Headquarters
6) Establish a single unified command to
integrate global transportation.
Acquisition Organization and Procedures
1) Create the position of Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition) (USD(A)) as the
Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE)
2) Services should have similar executives.
They will act as Service Acquisition
Executives (SAE).

3) The SAE appoints Program Executive
Officers (PEO), each responsible for a
set number of acquisition programs.
4) Program managers are responsible to the
respective PEO and report only to him
on program matters.
5) All federal statues governing
procurement should be recoded into a
single procurement statue.
6) Establish business-related education and
experience criteria for senior-level
acquisition personnel.
7) Establish the Joint Requirements and
Management Board (JRMB) co-chaired
by the CJCS and the USD(A) to define
requirements and select programs for
development.
8) Use a greater number of “off the shelf”
items.
9) Increase use of prototypes
10) Operational testing should be completed
prior to high-rate production.
11) Increase use of commercial-style
competition.
12) DoD should fully institutionalize
“baselining”
13) Greater use of multi-year procurement
14) Reduce requirements for Data rights
Government-Industry Accountability
1) Aggressively enforce federal civil and
criminal laws governing defense
acquisition.
2) Defense contractors should promulgate
and vigilantly enforce codes of ethics
and develop internal controls to monitor
themselves.
3) DoD should develop specific ethics
guidance on matters of DoD acquisition
and train personnel on such matters.
4) Oversight of defense contractors must be
better coordinated among the various
DoD agencies.
5) USD(A) should establish audit policies
and foster contractor self-governance.

(Summarized from PBRC:1986:xvi-xxx)
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Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986.
On 1 October 1986, President Reagan signed into Public Law 99-433, the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Such sweeping
changes had not been accomplished since the Reorganization Act of 1958. The acts
major provisions implemented many of the recommendations of the Packard
Commission.
1) In this act the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was strengthened in a manner
suggested by the Packard Commission (Benson 1996:21). Command
relationships were clarified and streamlined. No longer were Service Secretaries
included in the command chain.
As outlined in the conference report to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the law
intends generally for the Secretary to have ‘sole and ultimate power within
the Department of Defense on any matter on which the Secretary chooses
to act,’ giving him broad authority to reorganize DoD activities without
changing statutory arrangements (Donley 1995:91-92)
2) The Act “emphasized that experience in the joint (inter-Service) Unified
Commands and other joint organizations were more important to an officer’s
career advancement than assignments within one’s own Service” (Jones
1999:408). Joint duty was given higher accord when the Act made Joint Duty
necessary to qualify as a senior general or flag officer.

3) The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) was created to assist in preparing
written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans and
in reviewing such plans. He was also invited to be a member of DAB.

4) Service headquarter staffs were to be reduced. The Services were ordered to
eliminate panels that performed duties redundant to DoD organizations (Jones
1999:408). For this reason the AFSARC was later disestablished.
The primary purpose of the Act was to strengthen civilian control over the military and
reduce layering and duplication within the head quarters by designating a single office
within the Secretariat for Acquisition. The General Accounting Office (GAO) evaluated

- 58 -

the DoD reorganization and found civilian powers strengthened but Acquisition expertise
within the secretariat lacking. In particular, “military officers dominate the leadership
positions in acquisition secretariat” of the Air Force (GAO Acq Reform 1991:2). The
GAO report concludes that a lack of acquisition expertise in the secretariat and the
dominance of uniformed personnel within the acquisition secretariat weaken civilian
power over Air Force Acquisition.
Organizational Changes.
On July 1, 1986, the title, the Undersecretary of Defense (Research and
Engineering), was changed to Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition). The position of
Director for OT&E was established in September 1983; he is to report directly to the
Secretary of Defense (U.S. Organization 1998:38). The Air Force merged the positions
and staffs of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition with
the Assistant Secretary of Air Force (Research, Development, and Acquisition) to form
the office of the new Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition); he would
become the designated Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) for MDAPs. At first, the
Air Force Program Executive Officers (PEOs) were dual hated as Product Center
Commanders. The resulting oversight model is depicted in Figure 9.
Those granted the power to cancel, delay, or approve an MDAP are depicted in
Figure 9 with double outlines. Historically, personnel and organizations outside the PM,
PEO, CAE, and DAE have been known to exercise the same powers. The acquisition
culture expected the PMs to defer to the other organizations depicted in Figure 9 before
meeting an official DAB. It was a method to share responsibility and gain consensus
within DoD (Jones 1999:402).
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Figure 9: The Air Force Acquisition Oversight Hierarchy of 1988
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Streamlining (1988-2003)

In 1988, George Herbert Walker Bush was elected President. Diplomatically he
succeeded on many fronts: on 9 November 1989 the Berlin Wall was torn down and the
Soviet administration of Russia collapsed in 1990 putting an end to the Cold War.
Militarily he gained popular victories. He sent troops into Panama to overthrow General
Manuel Noriega by arresting him for drug trafficking thereby protecting the Americans
who lived there and the canal for international travel. He sent troops to keep the peace
in the war-torn Bosnia. Most notably he thwarted Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s
attempts to annex Kuwait in a combination of military actions collectively known as the
Persian Gulf War in 1991 (White House 2004:Bush).
Defense Management Review of 1989.
In July 1989, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney chartered the Defense
Management Review (DMR) Committee to identify ways of trimming expenses within
the DoD and implement the Packard Commission’s Recommendations fully (Elliot
1991:1). Common support functions such as defense acquisition were consolidated
through Defense Management Review Decisions. As a result of the DMR more authority
migrating to OSD officials, and responsibilities for day-to-day execution split between
newly created defense agencies combined to further diminished military departments.
The DMR
included 250 separate decisions to implement consolidations; improve
information systems, enhance management, and employ better business practices.
These decisions were expected to yield anywhere from $62 billion to $71 billion
in savings over a 5-year period and DoD’s budget were reduced up-front to
capture these savings. (GAO Defense Management 1998:3.2)
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The defense budget was cut drastically in anticipation of savings from reduced
infrastructure. Often realized savings were less then estimated or realized slower then
anticipated (GAO Defense Management 1998:3.2).
DMR greatly reduced the chain of command between the PM and the SAE.
Though the workforce between a PM and the SAE had decreased, the workforce between
the SAE and the DAE had not. The DAB include the over 20 appointed officials
(USD(A&T) Report 1995:10). Through DMR Decisions PMs were no longer required to
formally brief major command personnel. Formal briefings to OSD personnel were also
greatly reduced. PMs were slow to take advantage of reporting freedoms since program
success often relied on keeping OSD and Major Commands informed. (GAO
Acquisition Reform 1991:3-5)
Other then procedural and organizational changes, DMR decisions also revamped
the entire acquisition career field. In 12 June 1989, a DMR decision “had directed the
services to correct deficiencies in the training and development of personnel involved in
acquisition by developing plans for a dedicated corps of officers to serve as acquisition
specialists” (Benson 1996:23). Greater changes to the Acquisition career field were
made into law by Congress with the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act.
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 1990.
GAO noted that “while some program managers possessed substantial experience
and training, many did not” (GAO Acquisition Reform 1991:7). The same was true for
OSD and other supporting Acquisition personnel. In 1990 Congress formalized
requirements for acquisition professionals with the passage of the Defense Acquisition
Workforce Improvement Act. Within the Act were new education, training, and
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experience requirements. Also included was the following provision calling for more
civilians in the Acquisition workforce.
The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the acquisition workforce is managed
such that, for each fiscal year from October 1, 1991, through September 30, 1996,
there is a substantial increase in the proportion of civilians (as compared to armed
forces personnel) serving in critical acquisition positions in general, in program
manager positions, and in division head positions over the proportion of civilians
(as compared to armed forces personnel) in such positions on October 1, 1990.
(EC 2004: title 2 subsection 1721)
The acquisition community hierarchy was further supported by this act. This act partially
fulfilled the Packard Commission’s recommendation for a more permanent Acquisition
Workforce unlike the uniformed military who would move every two to four years.
Defense Science Board Report on Defense Acquisition Reform.
The Defense Science Board had existed as an advisory panel since 1954 and the
creation of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Science and Technology). In 1993
Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney asked the Defense Science Board (DSB) to advise
him on the best way to “acquire adequate defense capability, with state-of-the-art
technologies and industrial processes, at affordable prices, in the quantities needed”
(DSB 1993:i). DSB published four reports. Phase one came out in 1993 emphasizing the
need to adopt commercial practices into Defense Acquisition. Phase two came out in
1994 identifying defense industry segments for further commercialization, identified
major commands for increased responsibility in requirement generation, and identified
barriers to the implementation of commercial practices. Phase three came out in 1996
evaluating the possibility of extending commercial practices into the R&D phase of the
Acquisition Process (see Table 11). Phase four came out in 1999 reporting on the metrics
the DoD could establish to measure its implementation of Acquisition Reform initiatives.
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Table 11. Defense Science Board Task Force Recommendations
Phase I Recommendations
• Broaden procurement of
commercial products
• Increase the use of
simplified procurement
procedures … raises the
threshold to $100,000.
• Reduce reliance on cost
or pricing data.
• Select industries for
pilots to used
commercial practices to
acquire goods and
services.
• Select Major Commands
for greater role in
requirements definition.
• Make Annual Plans for
Commercialization
• Establish a standing
outside Review Group
• Establish a
comprehensive
education, training,
communications, and
outreach program for
government, industry,
and the public.

Phase II Recommendations
• Pilot Industries should
include military jet
engines , software, and
microelectronics.
• Increased CINC
Capabilities in
USACOM and
CENTCOM for
evaluating new
technologies and
developing joint user
needs in a more
flexible requirement
process.
• The DoD should allow
contractors to be
governed by the same
body of laws and
practices that cover the
commercial world
instead of DoD
specific ones.
• DoD should encourage
the use of commercial
practices and
specifications.

Phase III Recommendations
• DoD model Acquisition
Process on the American
free-market system
• R&D programs should
be phased to halve the
average time to field a
usable major system.
• Promote Integrated
Product Teams
composed of contractors,
users, and supplier
agencies to provide the
best solutions within
specific schedule and
price constraints.
• Use carefully structured,
relatively short, fixed
price/flexible
performance contracts.
• Implement riskreduction phase before
full system development
• Include contractor’s past
performance as
significant factors in
source selection.

DSB 1: 1993:iii-iv

DSB 2:1994:8

DSB 3:1996:i-ii

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993.
On 5 January 1993, Congress passed the Government Performance and Results
Act. Its purpose was “to provide for the establishment of strategic planning and
performance measurement in the Federal Government” and “improve internal
management of the Federal Government” (USC 2004). To this end, the GPO has
reported annually on the DoD’s performance starting in fiscal year 2000. Of the five
selected outcomes one directly measures the performance of the Acquisition Community,
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that “the U.S. maintains technological superiority in key war-fighting capabilities”
(GAO DoD 2001:1). GAO found that:
some of the performance goals underlying measures—such as procurement
spending and defense technology objectives—do not provide a direct link toward
meeting the goal [and that the] DoD’s performance report does not reflect
concerns raised within the Department about the adequacy of its strategy and the
timely introduction of new technologies to operation forces. (GAO DoD 2001:2)
The lesson to be learned here is that the Acquisition Process is complicated, interrelated,
and difficult to measure.
Process Action Team on Oversight and Review of 1994.
The Clinton Administration chartered a process action team to “…develop within
90 days a comprehensive plan to reengineer the oversight and review process for systems
acquisition, in both the Components and OSD, to make it more effective and efficient,
while maintaining an appropriate level of oversight” (PAT 1994:i). The
recommendations of the PAT team are depicted in Table 12. President Clinton
implemented several of their recommendations in a series of executive decisions.
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Table 12. Process Action Team Recommendations
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Reduce number of milestones; Forge a
Three-Milestone Process.
Trim Milestone Decision Documents
and Activities.
Collapse the number of formal premilestone meetings to one.
Institutionalize Integrated Product
Teams to Do Oversight and Review.
Align program accountability and
reporting for all acquisition programs,
not just the MDAPs.
Centralize the affordability decision
by placing it into the Warfighter’s
hands.
Consolidate the oversight and review
process for joint programs and those
programs requiring substantial interservice harmonizing.

•
•
•
•

•
•

Establish more stringent experience
criteria for ACAT I Program Managers
and Deputy Program Managers
Stabilize MDAP Program manager
tenure from program initiation until start
of production
Establish a Career Civilian Deputy for
the Defense Acquisition Executive and
each Component Acquisition Executive.
Revitalize the Acquisition Program
Baseline as the major program control
tool thereby eliminating need for other
documents.
Institutionalize a summit process for
ACAT I Programs
Apply reengineering principles to
contractor oversight.

(Summarized from the Process Action Team Report 1994:viii-xi)

National Performance Review.
With the end of the Cold War, many felt that the DoD funding should be reduced,
the national debt paid down, and other social programs prosper from the peace dividend.
Further budget cuts and workforce downsizing was inevitable. To better streamline the
DoD Acquisition Process President Clinton initiated the National Performance Review.
It offered the following initiatives: streamlining the Army Corps of Engineers, creating
incentives to generate revenues, establishing a unified budget, implementing a
productivity-enhancing capital investment fund, and reducing some National Guard and
Reserve costs. As part of the National performance Review President Clinton signed into
law the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act on 19 October 1994. Its purpose was to
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“overhaul the cumbersome and complex procurement system of the federal government”
(DSMB 2004). Some highlights are listed in Table 12.
Table 13. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) Highlights
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Eliminated most paperwork for acquisitions below $100,000 within the Simplified
Acquisition Threshold (SAT).
Allowed direct “micropurchases” of items below $2,500 without competitive quotations
or compliance with Buy American Act and certain small business requirements.
Promotes the acquisition of commercially available items
Establishing a Government –wide Federally Acquisition Computer Network (FACNET)
to make electronically available, MDAP materials
Established a six year limitation period for filing claims under the Contact Disputes Act
(CDA) and increased dollar thresholds for claim certification and the accelerated and
small claims procedures.
Reserved acquisitions over $2,500 but under $100,000 for small business concerns.
Expanded the Small Disadvantaged Business set-aside program to include civilian agency
procurements.
Established new 5% contracting Goal for women-owned small businesses.
Preserved private contractors’ ability to file bid protests in the U.S. District Courts and
authorizing federal district courts to obtain advisory opinions from board of contract
appeals.
Improved bid protest and contract administrations procedures.
Repealed that part of the Walsh-Healey Act requiring an offeror to certify that it is a
regular dealer or manufacturer.
Requiring evaluation of past performance before contract award.
Raising the Truth in Negotiation Act (TINA) threshold for requiring certified cost or
pricing data to a uniform $500,000 for both civilian agencies and DoD procurements.
(Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act as summarized by DSMB 2004)

Organizational Changes.
At the DoD level, best practices were being identified and implemented. In 1995,
Secretary of Defense William Perry directed the Department of Defense to employ the
use of Integrated Product Teams (IPT). The “IPT concept for oversight…is intended to
replace the current sequential process” that often times modify review documents greatly
or reject the product (USD(A&T) Report 1995:3). The Overarching IPTs, composed of
political appointees and its subordinate Working IPTs are used as advisors to the DAB.
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Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering was abolished in 1993 when
acquisition activities were transferred to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Technology.
With the passage of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 MDAPs the fell under the
Information Technology (IT) category were given a separate DAB, one called the
Information Technology Acquisition Board (ITAB) and the DAE duties were transferred
to the Under Secretary of Defense (Information Technology). The Act stated that the
level of expertise necessary to perform oversight of this highly technical field required a
different skill set then that provided by the DAB or the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition).
At the Air Force level Deputy Assistant Secretary Darleen Druyun issued a series
of reform measures known as “Lightening Bolt” initiatives. They are in brief form:
1) Centrally scrub all major requests for proposals
2) Create a standing acquisition strategy panel
3) Develop a new SPO manpower standard based on SAR programs
4) Cancel all AFMC center acquisition policies
5) Reinvent the AFSARC process using IPTs
6) Improve the consideration of past performance in making source selections
7) Consolidate documents required for milestone decision into a single acquisition
management plan.
8) Incorporate acquisition reform into the PEO and DAC portfolios.
9) Enhance workforce training and education.
10) Cut contract award time in half.
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11) Adopt business processes in laboratories. (Benson 1996:24)
Increased PEO responsibilities forced the Air Staff to “establish a separate PEO structure
in the Pentagon on 15 February 1990” (Benson 1996: 21). Product Center Commanders
gave 37 MDAPs to the PEOs but continue to give oversight to lesser programs (mainly
programs in Logistics and Communications). The new PEO structure absorbed AFSC
acquisition operations and in 1991, AFSC and AFLC were merged together into the Air
Force Material Command (AFMC). The new Air Force Material Command implemented
the concept of integrated weapons system management (IWSM). With one command in
charge of research, development, development tests and evaluation, acquisition, and
logistics AFMC could assign one PM to a MDAP and eliminate the need for program
management responsibility transfers (PMRT) (Benson 1996:22). The resulting oversight
construct is as follows.
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Figure 10: The Air Force Acquisition Oversight Hierarchy of 1994-2003

Ongoing Pilot Studies
In an effort to reduce the cost of oversight, the Bush Administration has enabled
three experimental oversight processes other then the current DoD 5000 series. The DoD
5000 series is the regulation that defines the boundaries of the Acquisition Process; it is
the “box” the pilot study groups are looking to reengineer. The Information Technology
MDAPs navigate through the “box” in the virtual realm. Instead of holding meetings
within the Pentagon, upper management will evaluate MDAPs over the Internet, video
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teleconference meetings, or via e-mail. The Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) has
taken their MDAPs through a smaller “box.” Instead of holding meetings at the
Pentagon, meetings are held in-house with a body of non-stakeholders. The team
provides a recommendation to the AFSPC Commander at key decision points. The
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is creating a new “box” that entails the use of program
experts instead of the OSD personnel. For additional information see Neal 2004,
Rousseau 2004, and DeReus 2004.

Summary
For the past five decades, the Air Force has made strides in organizing and
managing MDAPs as efficiently and effectively as possible. It inherited a heavily
encumbered process from the Army; one that entailed the use of commercially owned
labs and Army owned depots. Air Material Command was hard pressed to separate
Army assets from Air Force assets in their inventories, logistics support, and personnel.
Above the Air Force, the newly appointed Secretary of Defense had his hands tied by
statute and too small of a staff to handle the chore of eradicating duplicate processes. A
series of law changes greatly centralized power at the Secretary of Defense level,
changing his role from arbitrator between the services to the manager of the services and
sole defense advisor to the President. Secretary McNamara took advantage of these new
powers over budget and acquisition to liquidate duplication between the services.
Acquisition went from service unique to a more unified process. Several defense
agencies were created to facilitate a more unified acquisition process. When reports
alleging Defense fraud, waste, and abuse surfaced, emphasis was placed on increasing
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quality controls through the use of testing, longer development phases, and service
independent agencies (i.e. Cost Analysis Improvement Group).
The burden of numerous regulations and statues, tedious contractual devices, and
formal reporting requirements caused PMs and contractors to plead for relief. Such relief
was granted; regulations and statues were codified and reduced. The DoD has of late
been fashioning itself like a commercial business. Using corporations as a benchmark,
DoD has tried to reduce the cost of Acquisition in both time and money, as well as
increase the quality of DoD’s inventory. The Acquisition career path required more
training, education, and experience. The number of milestones in the MDAP lifecycle
was reduced from five to three. The future points at greater flexibilities in oversight
constructs. The future may hold several oversight hierarchies, each tailored to a
particular technology. Innovators would do well to study past constructs and learn from
history.
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III. Methodology and Analysis

Introduction

Per the United States Constitution, the role of the military has been to “provide
for the common defense.” To support this mission, the Department of Defense (DoD)
Acquisition Community has been able to develop and acquire the best weapons and
support systems in the world. Since its inception, the DoD have employed various forms
of oversight to manage Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP). Numerous
studies have been performed over four decades, assessing the status of the Acquisition
Process. Therefore it follows, that these studies are the “report card” of the
corresponding Acquisition Oversight Process. Studious examination of these reports has
revealed supportive evidence or a lack of evidence that a particular construct does not
meet eight goals outlined below.
The actors in the Acquisition Oversight Process and studies performed on them
were introduced in Chapter 2. This chapter identifies the job performance areas or work
criteria. This will form the basis of comparison between the constructs, one from each
decade.
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Criteria of Acquisition Oversight

The Acquisition Community’s overall task is to acquire systems for the armed
services in the most efficient manner. Those involved in the Acquisition Oversight
Process have a duty to ensure an appropriate level of review is performed on MDAPs
(PAT 1994:iv). The following are objectives that the Acquisition Oversight Process
should achieve as identified by the 1994 Oversight and Review Process Action Team.
1) Help field what the Warfighter needs when he needs it.
2) Demand accountability by matching managerial authority with responsibility
3) Promote flexibility and encourage innovation
4) Foster constant teamwork among everyone who is a stakeholder.
5) Actively promote program stability.
6) Balance the value of oversight and review with its costs.
7) Emulate the best practices of successful commercial companies and successful
Government ventures.
8) Preserve the public trust. (PAT 1994:iv-v)
Of the eight only seven are being assessed; a more thorough explanation follows.
Help field what the Warfighter needs when he needs it.
While requirements generation is not the focus of this thesis, it drives the
acquisition process. The desired outcome of this objective has two parts: 1) the quality
of the products being fielded, and 2) how quickly new capabilities become available.
Ideally, new capabilities will be available to Warfighters before a shortcoming in relation
to opposing forces is realized. The newest technology was only as good as its ability to
perform as advertised. The Warfighter must trust the equipment or they will abandon it
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and use what they are familiar with. Reports on weapons deployed to the field of war
and other military actions detail whether the Acquisition Process and its Oversight
process accomplished this objective.
Matching managerial authority with responsibility.
Role definition is key to this objective. The personnel performing oversight
activities receive their job descriptions from laws and regulations governing the
Acquisition Process. The emphasis of this objective is has three sides: 1) the clarity of
such role definition, 2) the ability of personnel to play their role without external
interference, and 3) whether decisions are made at the lowest level possible. Several
commission reports evaluate the managerial roles played by key Department persons.
Promote flexibility and encourage innovation.
To accomplish this objective, the Program Manager should be allowed, within
reason, to diverge from the set Acquisition Process, that is to tailor the Acquisition
Process depending upon such factors as the inherent program risk and complexity, the
program manager’s experience, the program’s history, total dollar value, Congressional
interest and similar factors.
Foster constant teamwork among everyone who is a stakeholder.
A reporting structure can serve to drive participants apart or it can encourage
teamwork. Setting stakeholders at cross purposes could jeopardize an MDAP progress.
Committee reports have commented on the harmony within the Acquisition Process.
Noted disharmony would signal that teamwork is not fostered in the process.
Actively promote program stability.
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Changes of requirements, in budgets, in contracting vehicles, and in the economy
or the beginnings of war are the leading factors in program disruptions. The Oversight
process could disrupt a program by delaying decision or undoing decisions. It is difficult
to estimate the value of such disruptions therefore this objective is subjective to the
beholder and can not be a basis of judging between constructs.
Balance the value of oversight and review with its costs.
The net-added-value of the Acquisition Oversight Process should be one where
the time, dollar, manpower, and opportunity costs of the process are clearly outweighed
by the added value to the decision maker. The cost of Acquisition Oversight has been
compared to the satisfactory roll out of military systems in past.
Emulate the best practices.
The Acquisition Oversight Process evolved during wartime into a fitful
amalgamation of expedient methods. Committees have compared the Department against
the best in industry and in government. Favorable reports are rare.
Preserve the public trust.
The Secretary of Defense, the President, the Congress, and the taxpayer should
have confidence that the oversight and review process is helping provide appropriate
stewardship of the public monies. Avenues should be available to reassure these
customers that the process is working.

Data Source
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Several major commissions studied the Department of Defense over the decades
of its existence (see Table 10). With in the text of the reports published by these groups
are comments about the performance of the oversight process of its time. For instance,
the First Hoover Commission, Rockefeller Committee and the Second Hoover
Commission shall be investigated for clues on the abilities of the Acquisition Oversight
Hierarchy of 1949. If the reports do not contain clues, GAO reports and historian
comments are used to assess the capabilities of the Acquisition Oversight Hierarchy to
accomplish the seven objectives. Generally Commission Reports, GAO reports and
historians often point out areas requiring further improvement rather then areas that are
sound. Therefore the data collected is used as evidence to support a construct is not able
to meet an objective.
Table 1. Major Commissions on Defense Acquisition Process
Date Major Commission
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1949 First Hoover Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch
1953 Rockefeller Committee
1955 Second Hoover Commission on the Organization of the Executive
Branch
1970 Fitzhugh Commission / Blue Ribbon Defense Panel
1972 Commission on Government Procurement
1983 Grace Commission / President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Controls
1986 Packard Commission / President’s Blue Ribbon Defense Commission
1994 Process Action Team on Oversight and Review
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1949 Oversight

With the Passage of the National Security Act of 1947 the Secretary of Defense
was created. The resulting Acquisition Oversight Process is depicted in Figure 4.

Secretary of Defense

Advisors: Joint Chiefs of Staff
OSD Munitions Board,
OSD R&D Board

Secretary of the Air Force

Air Force Chief of Staff

Deputy Chief of Staff
for Material

Air Material Command

Engineering Divisions

Air Force Procurement Officers

Material Divisions

Air Force Procurement Officers

Figure 5: The Air Force Acquisition Oversight Hierarchy of 1949

Help field what the Warfighter needs when he needs it.
On this objective the commission studies were silent. Air Force Historian
Lawrence Benson notes that the Air Force primarily relied on European agencies to
perform research, develop and in some case to produce weapon systems (Benson
1996:10). Despite budget cuts, the Air Force was able to reach the supersonic age with
the introduction of Lockheed’s F-80, the Republic’s F-84, and the North American made
F-86. These planes were instrumental in the Korean War (McNaugher 1989:30). The
World War II aircraft were driven by propellers and were no match for the Russian made
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MiG. The majority opinion is that the 1949 construct did provide Warfighters with
needed technologies in time to meet wartime aggressions. Therefore there is a lack of
evidence to support the Warfighter needs objective not being met.
Matching managerial authority with responsibility.
The First Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch found
“continued disharmony and lack of unified planning” (National Security Organization
Report quoted by Defense Policy 1988:29). In their report to Congress, the Commission
found that both the President and the Secretary of Defense was severely limited by
statutes on the membership of key Boards, on the organization of the Department, and on
the budget of the Services. Such limits on authority allowed the Services to function as a
federation rather than as a unified defense department. The Munitions Board and the
Research and Development Boards were both advisors to the President and Secretary of
Defense, lacking the authority to direct unified acquisitions. Some units such as the
Army Corps of Engineers had direct authority from Congress and were therefore outside
the powers of the president, Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Army.
Statutory authority is delegated to subordinate units, the department head is left
with only the most general supervisory powers over policies, operations, and
budgets. In such cases, the department head cannot enforce consistent policies
and obtain the necessary efficiency and economy. Nor can he be held strictly
accountable since he lacks authority to carry out the mandates of determined
policy (National Security Organization Report quoted by Defense Policy
1988:31).
The Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization found that
Service Secretaries were often omitted from military affairs and left with those of
political, economic, and industrial affairs. There was a dual chain of command that

- 79 -

muddied the line of responsibilities from the Secretary of Defense to the Military chiefs.
Further, they found
a long record of challenges based on a legalistic argument that the phrase in the
national Security Act which requires that the three military departments be
‘separately administered’ is a limitation on the authority of the Secretary of
Defense (Report of the Rockefeller Committee as quoted by OSD History
1978:129).
The Second Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government noted there is “vagueness in the assignment of responsibility for support
activities between the military Chiefs of Staff and the civilian executives” (Business
Organization of the Department of Defense quoted by Defense Policy 1988:61).

In the

management vacuum “the bureaus of the Navy and the technical services of the Army
have enjoyed a high degree of autonomy” (Business Organization of the Department of
Defense quoted by Defense Policy 1988:62). There is evidence that the 1947 Acquisition
Oversight Process did not meet this objective.
Promote flexibility and encourage innovation.
The First Hoover Commission did not address this objective. The Rockefeller
Committee on Department of Defense Organization found that the Research and
Development board was “handicapped in carrying out its functions by the rigidity of its
membership and the complicated administrative mechanism inherent in the board-type
structure” (Report of the Rockefeller Committee as quoted by OSD History 1978:138).
The Munitions Board suffered from the same rigidity. The Second Hoover Commission
notes that the acquisition bureaus were mostly autonomous, that services had little
control over them during peace, and that military oversight over the bureaus were
growing stronger (Business Organization of the Department of Defense quoted by
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Defense Policy 1988:68). Below the OSD the Services strove to protect themselves from
Congressional Inquires and Judicial suits brought forth mostly by dissatisfied contractors.
The trend in Acquisition Contracting was towards inflexible contracts with elaborate
specifications and extensive testing that could take up to two years. Such practices
would serve as a legal defense against law suits or inquires (McNaugher 1989:21). There
is evidence that the 1947 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this objective.
Foster constant teamwork among everyone who is a stakeholder.
The First Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch found
disharmony in the Department made apparent by the overt Service rivalries. “There is a
lack of close working relationships among such important elements as the Research and
Development Board and the Joint Chiefs of Staff” (National Security Organization
Report quoted by Defense Policy 1988:30). Service secretaries had statutory “authority
to resist the supervision of the Secretary of Defense in budgetary matters” (National
Security Organization Report quoted by Defense Policy 1988:31). The Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS), as a unit reported to the President and the Secretary of Defense, as individual
Service Chiefs they reported to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and individual
Service Secretaries. By design, the Service Chiefs is more apt to curry to the Service
Secretary who is his direct supervisor then to answer the needs of the Department. The
JCS activities were “not well-coordinated with intra [Departmental] operations, or with
the policy work of the Cabinet councils” (National Security Organization Report quoted
by Defense Policy 1988:30-32).
The Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization found the
dual role performed by the Joint Chiefs were noted as and invitation to Service

- 81 -

competition or rivalries. They emphasized the need to hold joint meetings, not just with
Service Chiefs but also with Service Secretaries, and between working-level staff
members within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Such meetings would
serve to improve cooperation, harmonize functions, and enable the staffers to coordinate
their thinking with that of the Secretary of Defense (OSD History 1978:128-149)
The Second Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government noted four obstacles impeding teamwork:
1) decisions and information does not flow freely from the JCS to the Assistant
Secretaries of Defense;
2) “the assignment of responsibilities among members of [OSD] impedes
effective coordination;”
3) “the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretaries in the military departments
differ significantly in nature and scope—a condition which complicates
coordination and understanding between each department and the [OSD] and
among the departments themselves;”
4) “responsibility for the management of support activities is not clearly defined
between the principal military and the principal civilian executives” (Business
Organization of the Department of Defense quoted by Defense Policy
1988:61-62).
There is evidence that the 1947 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this
objective.
Balance the value of oversight and review with its costs.
The First Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch were
conscious of the cost of maintaining a large standing military stating that the huge
military budget should “be used with efficiency, and that costs shall be commensurate
with actual needs without damaging or destroying our national economy.” Their focus
was on holding the military accountable but the Commission had little insight into the
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specific cost of oversight and review (National Security Organization Report quoted by
Defense Policy 1988:28). The Rockefeller Committee had a similar prospective stating
that “The American people will support the President and the Secretary of Defense in
establishing an organization of the Department of Defense which is capable of providing
the nation with maximum security at minimum cost and without danger to our free
institutions, based on the fundamental principle of civilian control of the Military
Establishment” (OSD History 1978:128). The Second Hoover Commission did not
comment on this objective. There is a lack of evidence that the 1947 Acquisition
Oversight Process did not meet this objective.
Emulate the best practices
The First Hoover Commission Organization stated that there are three principles
that underlie good Government management: “efficiency, economy, and clear
accountability to the Congress and the people.” The Commission goes on to say that
“these principles have been repeatedly violated” (National Security Organization Report
quoted by Defense Policy 1988:32). Similarly the Rockefeller Committee stated that best
organization have achieved four objectives: 1) clear line of authority 2) Clear roles and
mission for the Services 3) Planning based on the most effective use of modern scientific
and industrial resources and 4) Maximum economies (i.e. cost controls) without injuring
military strength. It goes on to say that “the Department of Defense cannot now attain
these four objectives in full” (OSD History 1978:128). The Second Hoover Commission
stated simply that the weaknesses of the oversight “are due to the expansion of the
military services…these faulty systems are encumbered by traditions…arise from static
laws from other days which create roadblocks to effective improvement” (Business
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Organization of the Department of Defense quoted by Defense Policy 1988:51). There is
evidence that the 1947 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this objective.
Preserve the public trust.
The First Hoover Commission Organization stated the need for accountability in
order to preserve the public trust but did not say the military had lost said trust. The
Rockefeller Committee similarly stated that the American people trust and support the
President in reorganizing the military especially with the state of world affairs (i.e. the
invasion of Korea by Communist China). The Second Hoover Commission Organization
made no comment on public trust. There is a lack of evidence that the 1947 Acquisition
Oversight Process did not meet this objective.
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1964 Oversight

The Korean War ended in 1953 and the Vietnam War was just beginning just as
President Eisenhower was ending his second term in office. The Acquisition Oversight
Structure in 1964 is the end result of the 1949 amendment to the National Security Act,
Reorganization plan number 6 of 1953, Reorganization Acts of 1958 and Secretary
McNamara’s influences. See Figure 8.
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Figure 8: The Air Force Acquisition Oversight Hierarchy of 1964
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Help field what the Warfighter needs when he needs it.
The Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Panel the practice of firm-fixed price contracts, total
package procurement, and Production/Development concurrency led to ill-conceived
systems that often included out-dated technologies. According to the Panel these factors
inhibits the “developer’s capability to achieve the best product” (Report by the Blue
Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in Defense Policy 1988:220). As a consequence,
Warfighters were receiving a product that partially met needs, was better then the system
it replaced but had flaws requiring several interim fixes. “In a sample of 22 weapon
systems deployed to Southeast Asia [Vietnam] from 1965-1970, DoD studies found all
but one had suffered major deficiencies in the field” (Benson 1996:17). There is
evidence that the 1964 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this objective.
Matching managerial authority with responsibility.
The Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Panel was unhappy with the strong practices Secretary
McNamara exhibited. They found that
effective civilian control is impaired by a generally excessive centralization of
decision-making authority at the level of the Secretary of Defense. The
Secretary’s ability to selectively delegate authority and decentralize management,
while still retaining personal authority on major policy issues of the Department,
is seriously inhibited by the present organizational structure (Report by the Blue
Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in Defense Policy 1988:149).
The panel notes that in R&D “responsibility and management for conducting such
research are widely fragmented among and within the Military Services and the Defense
Agencies” (Report by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in Defense Policy

- 86 -

1988:213). There is evidence that the 1964 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet
this objective.
Promote flexibility and encourage innovation
The Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Panel found several aspects of the Acquisition System
that discouraged innovation. With regards to Research and Development the Panel found
some of the [DoD] in-house laboratories display a not-invented-here attitude that
inhibits objective consideration of independent research and development
products as alternatives to laboratory-originated technological approaches.
(Report by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in Defense Policy 1988:213)
Innovation from independent laboratories was generally discouraged. In Advanced,
Engineering, and Operational Systems Development the Panel found that requirements
were received from field units then translated from broad requirements into system
specifics by unilateral Service commands. The options available to fulfill requirements
are further boxed in by the practice of establishing firm-fixed contracts with firm
schedules and costs estimates before the advance development phase. These are
schedules and cost estimates for the total project including production, operation, and
maintenance. The Panel found the “Program Managers find themselves responsible for
administering a fixed price contract for development of a product to detailed design
specifications on which they are permitted little flexibility for technical trade-offs”
(Report by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in Defense Policy 1988:213). The
Panel also found that Congress’ Selected Acquisition Reports also inhibits minute
changes in cost and schedule further confining PMs. Any change in a SAR could subject
the MDAP to a Congressional Review. There is evidence that the 1964 Acquisition
Oversight Process did not meet this objective.
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Foster constant teamwork among everyone who is a stakeholder.
The Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Panel found that “no formal mechanism exists within
OSD to assure adequate coordination among the various elements of the Department”
(Report by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in Defense Policy 1988:149). The
Panel goes on to note that routing an Acquisition Document through the hierarchy, or:
staffing for the President and the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Military Departments is awkward and unresponsive; it provides a
forum for inter-Service conflicts to be injected into the decision-making process.
(Report by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in Defense Policy 1988:149)
In order for a team to work well, information must flow freely between all levels of the
said team. The panel found that information does not flow freely; “differing opinions are
submerged or compromised at lower levels of the DoD” and the large staffs employed by
both the military and OSD delays or muddies the information received by the President
and the Secretary of Defense (Report by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in
Defense Policy 1988:149). There is evidence that the 1964 Acquisition Oversight
Process did not meet this objective.
Balance the value of oversight and review with its costs.
The Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Panel found that oversight and review cost more then
it should. As the Panel explains, proposals received from contractors “may way as much
as one ton” and the personnel required to review them team into the hundreds (Report by
the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in Defense Policy 1988:218). DoD had just
implemented the Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) to review
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MDAPs formally more than once during its lifetime. The Panel applauded the
implementation of DSARC but lamented on the layers of Service headquarter
management and Chief of Staff personnel between the PM and DSARC.
Typically, for major weapons systems, the Program manager reports to the
Deputy Commander for Systems Management or the procuring command, some
five-or-six levels below that of the Secretary of the Military Service. (Report by
the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in Defense Policy 1988:226)
Not mentioned are the levels of management between the Service Secretary to the
DSARC. The cost of staffing an item up from the PM to the DSARC is not mentioned
but as an starting figure one can be deduced from the cost of reviewing a proposal. The
cost of reviewing a proposal, according to the Panel, is upwards of $100 million per
proposal. There is evidence that the 1964 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet
this objective.
Emulate the best practices
According to the Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Panel, the Acquisition workforce were
not well trained, offered few advancement opportunities, and for the most part stagnated.
It found that
“the promotion and rotation systems of the military Services do not facilitate
career development in the technical and professional activities, such as research
and development, procurement, intelligence, communications, and automatic data
processing” (Report by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in Defense
Policy 1988:149).
Further that “there is no indication of consistent efforts by the Services to select Program
Managers from among those officers who have the most promising potential.” Worst yet,
the Panel found that the PM in a matrix organization had a staff that worked for them
part-time. “Their efficiency ratings, promotions and reporting lines are not to or through
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the Program Manager, but rather to their superior within the functional organization”
(Report by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in Defense Policy 1988:149).
Those appointed above the PM were likewise ill-treated.
The Commission on Government Procurement also made comment on the
workforce.
When we undertook our studies of the procurement work force it could not be
determined from any single source how many people are engaged in procurement,
what skills are needed, or how they are being provided. (Report of the
Commission on Government Procurement Vol 1 as quoted by Defense Policy
1988:443).
The Commission estimated that one fourth of said workforce were about to retire with no
foreseeable recruitment or training of replacements. The Commission notes that the each
Service had some form of procurement career development and training but they “were
not comparable either with each other or with the civilian programs” (Report of the
Commission on Government Procurement Vol 1 as quoted by Defense Policy 1988:447).
Such treatment of personnel is not a good practice.
On the issue of contractor treatment, both the Panel and the Commission agreed
that the DoD did not use best practices of commercial firms. Contractors were subject to
numbers reports, scrutiny but defense agencies placed in their company, and a complex
array of regulations and statues. The situation discouraged rather than encourage firms to
compete for government contracts.
On the issue of management, both the Panel and the Commission lamented on the
burden of regulations and statues placed on the procurement officers or PMs. Several of
these regulations are noted to contradict each other (Defense Policy 1988:428-434).
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There is evidence that the 1964 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this
objective.
Preserve the public trust.
Public trust had eroded since the 1949. As more panels, commissions, and other
reports became public, there had been a noted lack of confidence in the oversight system.
The Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Panel
“recognizes that the Department of Defense currently lacks the confidence of a
significant segment of the American public. While some of this is undoubtedly
due to misunderstandings, basically the Department must work harder to do the
jobs assigned to it as efficiently as possible and to keep the public properly
informed.” (Fitzhugh Commission Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel as
quoted by Defense Policy 1988:165)
Such was the degree of eroded confidence that Congress established the Commission on
Government Procurement with Public Law 91-129. During the hearings conducted by
congress on this law, it was found that “Congress and the public are deeply concerned
about the effectiveness of procurement and the manner in which it is conducted” (Report
of the Commission on Government Procurement Vol 1 as quoted by Defense Policy
1988:400). There is evidence that the 1964 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet
this objective.
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1977 Oversight

The Vietnam War ended in 1974 and President Ford was elected to office. The
Acquisition Oversight Structure in 1977 is the end result of the implementation of
Packard Initiatives and the DoD’s corrective actions in response to the Fitzhugh Panel
and the Commission on Government Procurement reports. See Figure 8.
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Help field what the Warfighter needs when he needs it.
According to the President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Controls (PPSSCC)
Task Force on the OSD, hence forth call the Grace Commission, too many new major
weapons systems were allowed to start thereby resulting
in each program being given less than the required resources which, in turn,
increases system costs and delays…the system may end up being obsolete and
may be built in insufficient numbers to meet the mission. (PPSSCC as quoted by
Defense Policy 1988:797-798)
The President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, hence forth called
the Packard Commission, states “too many of our weapon systems cost too much, take
too long to develop, and by the time they are fielded, incorporate obsolete technology”
(President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management 1986:44). There is
evidence that the 1977 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this objective.
Matching managerial authority with responsibility
The Grace Commission found that the DoD use too many committees thereby
defusing authority. Also the Commission found that PMs are reluctant to accurately
portray the status of the programs they are assigned to and “often continue until someone
else shuts them down” (PPSSCC as quoted by Defense Policy 1988:660). As a result,
PMs push responsibility back up to where real authority is perceived to exist. Higher
managers, faced with an overwhelming burden, create committees or other management
layer to the process thereby diffuses authority and responsibility even further. In
summary, the Committee found that
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Program managers are not presently held responsible for all aspects of the
program, since they are not able to control certain aspects, such as funding and
program changes. Accountability for a program is shared by a number of
entities—the services, the program manger, the Congress and OSD. As a result,
no one is really held accountable. (PPSSCC as quoted by Defense Policy
1988:818)
The Packard Commission found that “an army of advocates for special interests
descends on the program” to “demand that the program manager take or refrain from
taking some action” thereby producing “a diffusion of management responsibility, in
which everyone is responsible, and no one is responsible” (President’s Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management 1986:44-45). The Commission depicts the role of
the PM as someone held responsible for the cost, schedule, or performance of the
program but find themselves as “a supplication for, rather than a manager of, his
program” (President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management 1986:45).
There is evidence that the 1977 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this
objective.
Promote flexibility and encourage innovation.
The Grace Commission found that the DoD, by its organization and incentives to
management, discourage change and thereby innovations.
Few management tools are in place to make innovation automatic. Most private
sector companies establish guidelines to demonstrate their willingness to invest
capital to reduce costs, improve service or increase productivity. Instead, the
Government sometimes sets up systems which inhibit or retard change. (PPSSCC
as quoted by Defense Policy 1988:664)
Culturally the Government was found to avoid change or innovations. The Commission
found that “most Government personnel strictly adhere to the regulations, even when
some flexibility is intended by the regulations, in order to avoid criticism” (PPSSCC as
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quoted by Defense Policy 1988:764). Program Managers had fallen victim to this mind
set more often then not. The Packard Commission found that law and regulation tend to
make acquisition procedures even more inflexible and removes whatever motivation
exists for the exercise of individual judgment (President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on
Defense Management 1986:44). There is evidence that the 1977 Acquisition Oversight
Process did not meet this objective.
Foster constant teamwork among everyone who is a stakeholder.
Through surveys and interviews with stakeholders, the Grace Commission has
concluded that there is a pervasive feeling within DoD that the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) does not have the final say. In the Commission’s estimation, “the
military have never really bought into the need for central management by the Secretary
of Defense” (PPSSCC as quoted by Defense Policy 1988:603). The Commission found
that “even after 35 years of OSD, Congress continues to deal directly with the services—
and vice versa—and frequently around OSD” (PPSSCC as quoted by Defense Policy
1988:640). The Commission found “widespread feelings that OSD interfered with the
service organizations by micromanaging their businesses” further that “OSD was not
performing the function that subordinate units needed the most” (PPSSCC as quoted by
Defense Policy 1988:657).
The Commission reasoned that the cause of such feelings was due to indistinct
roles and missions performed by OSD. The fuzzy nature of roles and missions was the
result of two organization quirks. First that “many staff functions which were placed in
OSD were never completely eliminated from the staffs of the Service Secretaries” and
second that “emphasis was on the political, the expedient, and the doable” instead of the
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long-term mission orientation needed (PPSSCC as quoted by Defense Policy 1988:657).
The lack of clarity "invites and even encourages turf battles” (PPSSCC as quoted by
Defense Policy 1988:658).
The Packard Commission portrays a starker environment where several special
interest groups, including Congressional committees, fight to make their interests
paramount and demand the PM attention. The infighting results in gold-plating
requirements and a high incidence of cost overruns on MDAPs; it also elongates the time
it takes to field a system (President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management
1986:46-47). There is evidence that the 1977 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet
this objective.
Balance the Value of oversight and review with its cost.
The Grace Commission was disturbed by the hundreds of thousands of people
needed to perform acquisition and its oversight.
Throughout the acquisition system in DoD, there are major overlaps of functions
in OSD and the Services which make the process of acquiring major weapons
systems both more costly and more time consuming than necessary. (PPSSCC as
quoted by Defense Policy 1988:647)
According to the Grace Commission “there are 65,000 people in DoD who are directly
involved in the acquisition process” (PPSSCC as quoted by Defense Policy 1988:750).
Further, that each person also have roughly seven people supporting them. Arguably,
Acquisition Oversight is one of the primary duties performed by the 65,000. The
Packard Commission estimated the number of people closer to 145,000. There is
evidence that the 1977 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this objective.
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Emulate the best practices.
The Grace Commission found that, unlike successful private firms, the DoD did
not practice goal setting, did not have a method to perform self evaluations, did not
delegate authority well and resisted change (PPSSCC as quoted by Defense Policy
1988:660-664). In regards to organization, the Commission found “no clear insight or
emphasis on long-range planning” (PPSSCC as quoted by Defense Policy 1988:649).
The Commission “believes that DoD places undue reliance on written regulations to
accomplish the job of acquiring weapons systems.” The Commission notes that “private
industry has learned that spending scarce private funds is best accomplished, not by
voluminous written regulations, buy by brief policy statements which provide guidance
for skilled professionals” (PPSSCC as quoted by Defense Policy 1988:765).
The Packard Commission found six practices that DoD should emulate but don’t.
The are as follows
1) Clear command channels that is a short, unambiguous chain-of-command to the
decision maker.
2) Stability in performance demanded, schedule and funding.
3) Limited reporting requirements
4) Small, high-quality staff to manage the program rather than sell it or defend it.
5) Greater communication with users throughout the lifecycle of the system.
6) Greater use of prototyping and testing.
Further the Commission found that “compared to its industry counterparts [the Defense
Acquisition Workforce] is undertrained, underpaid, and inexperienced” (President’s Blue
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Ribbon Commission on Defense Management 1986:66). There is evidence that the 1977
Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this objective.
Preserve the public trust.
On this objective the Grace Commission was relatively silent. The Commission
found that there was a perception “that the acquisition process is largely inefficient and
uncontrollable” (PPSSCC as quoted by Defense Policy 1988:750). The President
established the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard
Commission) due to so called horror stories involving alleged fraud, waste, and abuse in
the Acquisition Process had shaken public confidence. To its credit the DoD had been
forthcoming regarding these issues and public about the remedies being implemented
(President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management 1986:44). There is
evidence that the 1977 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this objective.
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1988 Oversight

President Reagan responded to the Grace Commission and Packard Commission
by implementing a series of organizational changes. The resulting Acquisition Oversight
Hierarchy is depicted in Figure 9.
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Help field what the Warfighter needs when he needs it.
Several organizations were pleased with the performance of hardware in the
Persian Gulf War (Jones 1999:423). A “remarkable performance and reliability of a host
of sophisticated aerospace systems” was witnessed during this war (Benson 1996:20).
The PAT noted that the Acquisition Oversight and Review process “is pretty good” in
this respect (PAT 1994:7). There is no evidence that the 1988 Acquisition Oversight
Process did not meet this objective.
Matching managerial authority with responsibility
The PAT was silent on this aspect. There is no evidence that the 1988
Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this objective.
Promote flexibility and encourage innovation.
The PAT commented on the inflexibility of the reporting requirements, the
regulations, and statues governing MDAPs. The underlying culture of the Acquisition
Process is such that strict adherence to these instructions are expected (PAT1994:19-21).
There is evidence that the 1988 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this
objective.
Foster constant teamwork among everyone who is a stakeholder.
The PAT identified three issues that hinder teamwork: Sub-optimization of
functional talents, the manner staffers handle issues, and the late involvement of
functional experts. In OSD staffs are organized along functional veins and integrated
groups are not formed when milestone reviews commence “as a result, each staff
elements; oversight and review is often oriented toward achieving the best functional
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solution instead of the best overall program solution” (PAT 1994:18). Therefore the
decision-maker “are left with the responsibility for integrating the information from these
functional areas” when teamwork between functional representatives could better
optimize the solution (PAT 1994:8).

Another hindrance to team work is the

staffer’s tendency to reveal issues or problems to decision makers prior to making the PM
aware of them. Staffers should work with PMs to find solutions to issues for Decision
Maker’s review. The PAT teams suggests that early involvement of functional staffers to
the program would alleviate the previous two issues. There is evidence that the 1988
Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this objective.
Balance the Value of oversight and review with its cost.
The PAT found that the average delay directly attributable to the Acquisition
Oversight Process is “15 weeks beyond the scheduled 180-day Defense Acquisition
Board process as laid out in the DoD 5000 series. The size of the workforce employed
for this process is assessed to bee too numerous to count. The cost of reviews ranged
between $10 million and $12 million. The PAT saw these costs as excessive (PAT
1994:7-9). There is evidence that the 1988 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet
this objective.
Emulate the best practices.
Corporations perform fewer reviews then Government organizations. “Before the
actual milestone decision meeting, there are a series of formal and informal component
and OSD pre-meetings” which include “functional reviews as well as broad reviews
within the Component” (PAT 1994:37). The PAT sees the pre-meetings as time used by
Components “to establish their position vis-à-vis OSD” (PAT 1994:37). It is a practice
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that undermines teamwork and produces lengthy delays. There is evidence that the 1988
Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this objective.
Preserve the public trust.
The PAT was silent on this objective. It would appear from reviewing historian
accounts that there is a lack of evidence that 1988 Acquisition Oversight Process did not
meet this objective.

Chapter Summary

This chapter laid out the methodology for analysis of the various Acquisition
Oversight Hierarchies. Table 11 compares the Acquisition Oversight Hierarchies.
Table 11. Acquisition Oversight Objectives
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VI. Conclusion

Review of Research Objectives

This study started out with three main objectives. They are as follows.
1) Define, document, and utilize available literature relevant to Acquisition
Oversight procedures, to identify the organizations involved with the process
as it evolved to its form today.
2) Build models of the Acquisition Oversight Process, emphasis on the chain of
command construct, as it existed in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and
present process.
3) Evaluate each on its ability to accomplish the seven objectives identified by
Clinton’s 1994 Process Action Team on Acquisition Oversight using past
research relevant to Acquisition Oversight procedures.

Discussion on Results

Table 11 displays the results of the qualitative analysis. The various Commission
Reports included evidence that the Acquisition Oversight Hierarchies of all periods did
not meet criteria three through six signifying that more improvement in those areas can
still be achieved. The second through sixth criteria was more meaningful then the first or
the seventh. It was easy to find opinions regarding them. One problem, there is a lack of
evidence that the commissions held each oversight process to the same standard. For a
better analysis, a benchmark should be set and experts grade to that benchmark. The first
criteria was difficult to determine without references to wartime performance. The
qualitative analysis would benefit from a more thorough discovery on how weapons
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created under a certain oversight process performed in war. The seventh criteria was
rarely addressed in the commission reports. Public opinion is hard to measure or assess
and can be easily swayed by poor information. For future research this criterion should
be eliminated from consideration.
Table 11. Acquisition Oversight Objectives
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Recommendations for Future Research

There are four areas for future research that should be considered. The first
relates to the evaluation process used to compare the historical constructs. The second
relates to the possible quantitative comparison of the historical constructs. The third
relates to the preferred acquisition oversight process. The fourth relates to sister services.
Now that the participants in Acquisition Oversight Process have been identified,
the process of evaluating its performance could be enhanced. For instance, a better scale
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could be developed for evaluating the constructs accomplishment of these goals.
Different objectives could be identified for evaluation. Another avenue would be to
enlist the opinions of experts on these constructs and validate the models.
A further analysis of the cost of Acquisition Oversight could be performed. The
Commission reports alluded to various studies on the number of people and the time
needed to navigate through the Acquisition Oversight Process. Further comparisons
using quantitative reports could reveal the true standings between each historical process.
These numerical costs could be compared to relative benefits each construct offers. To
assist research in this area, data should be gathered on each MDAP going though the
oversight processes.
A comparison of the models developed here could be compared to the actual track
a program goes through using available program specific documentation. Through this
type of analysis it could be shown whether PMs favored the path outlined in regulations
or if they diverted from said path. If the results confirm widespread divergence, further
analysis could be on why such divergence is favored. This could lead to further
acquisition refinements to accommodate PM choices.
This research centered on the Air Force Acquisition Oversight process as it
developed through time. A study could be commenced on Army or Navy Acquisition
Oversight processes and a comparison made between the services. There may be
evidence that decentralizing the oversight process benefits society.
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